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INTRODUCTION
THE SEARCH FOR AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT
Jeremy K. Kessler * & David E. Pozen **
Over the past decade, the Roberts Court has handed down a series
of rulings that demonstrate the degree to which the First Amendment
can be used to thwart economic and social welfare regulation—
generating widespread accusations that the Court has created a “new
Lochner.” This introduction to the Columbia Law Review’s
Symposium on Free Expression in an Age of Inequality takes up three
questions raised by these developments: Why has First Amendment law
become such a prominent site for struggles over socioeconomic inequality? Does the First Amendment tradition contain egalitarian elements
that could be recovered? And what might a more egalitarian First
Amendment look like today?
After describing the phenomenon of First Amendment Lochnerism,
we trace its origins to the collapse of the early twentieth-century “progressive” model of civil libertarianism, which offered a relatively statist,
collectivist, and labor-oriented vision of civil liberties law. The recent
eruption of First Amendment Lochnerism is also bound up with
transformations in the economic and regulatory environment associated
with the advent of “informational capitalism” and the “information
state.” First Amendment Lochnerism may reﬂect contemporary judicial
politics, but it has deep roots.
To ﬁgure out how to respond to the egalitarian anxieties besetting
the First Amendment, it is natural to consult normative theories of free
speech. Yet on account of their depoliticization and abstraction, the
canonical theories prove indeterminate when confronted by these anxieties. Instead, it is a series of midlevel conceptual and jurisprudential
moves that most often do the work of resisting First Amendment
Lochnerism. This grammar of free speech egalitarianism, we suggest,
*. Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School.
**. Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For instructive comments on an earlier
draft, we thank Enrique Armijo, Vince Blasi, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Jameel Jaffer, Lina
Khan, Ramya Krishnan, Henry Monaghan, Jed Purdy, Fred Schauer, Ganesh Sitaraman,
Nelson Tebbe, Laura Weinrib, and Tim Wu. For their assistance with this Essay and their
stewardship of the Symposium, we are especially grateful to Joseph Catalanotto, Eve Levin,
Sam Matthews, Kelsey Ruescher, Jeff Stein, and Tomi Williams.
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enables the creative elaboration of a few basic motifs concerning the
scope and severity of judicial enforcement, the identiﬁcation and reconciliation of competing speech interests, and the quality and accessibility
of the overall expressive system. If First Amendment Lochnerism is to be
countered in any concerted fashion, the roadmap for reform will be
found within this grammar; where it gives out, a new language may
become necessary.
INTRODUCTION: THE EGALITARIAN ANXIETY ...........................................1954
I. THE LONG ROAD TO THE ROBERTS COURT........................................1961
A. First Amendment Lochnerism ..................................................1962
B. The Rise and Fall of Progressive Civil Libertarianism ..............1964
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C. From Speaker to System ............................................................2000
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INTRODUCTION: THE EGALITARIAN ANXIETY
The specter of inequality haunts the American legal imagination. For
an ideologically diverse range of scholars, policymakers, and activists,
growing inequality names both the deep cause and the dangerous effect of a
set of overlapping conflicts—economic, racial, cultural, constitutional—that
threaten the stability of contemporary U.S. society. Of course, the problem of
inequality is nothing new. The nation’s constitutive ideals of economic
independence and democratic self-rule have long achieved realization
through practices of mastery: in particular, through the power wielded by
white male property owners over the nonwhite, the nonmale, and the poor.1
Given the role that material disparities have played in American
political development, it is no surprise that the legal meaning of equality
has proved especially contentious, or that this meaning has changed
dramatically over time. Likewise, the relative priority of equality within
the inventory of American constitutional values has tended to ebb and
1. See generally Laura Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the
Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (2009); Aziz Rana, The Two
Faces of American Freedom (2010).
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ﬂow. In the 1860s and 1960s, for instance, the dominance of equality talk
heralded the collapse of preexisting racial and (in the 1960s) sexual
settlements, as well as the transformation of federalism, the separation of
powers, and a host of individual constitutional rights. Today, equality talk
is once again at the center of the legal conversation, challenging foundational assumptions about how numerous ﬁelds of law are organized and
studied and about the social functions they are meant to serve. Why?
One proximate cause is the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the economic
disruption that followed in its wake. Congress’s and the executive
branch’s “seemingly plutocratic response to the crisis” inspired “angry
attacks by protesters on both left and right,”2 from Occupy Wall Street to
the Tea Party. The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v.
FEC,3 striking down statutory limits on corporate electioneering, compounded these concerns. By 2014, Americans had become alarmed
enough to make a bestseller of economist Thomas Piketty’s 700-page
empirical study of capitalism and inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century.4 Two years later, the antiplutocratic politics of the early 2010s
found a still broader outlet in the 2016 presidential election. For a
decade now, the “anxiety that the ‘Great Recession’ . . . deﬁnes a new
economic normal,”5 in which the wealthiest individuals take an ever
larger piece of an ever shrinking pie, has shaped American public culture.
The conditions and aftermath of President Donald Trump’s
ascendancy make clear that the resurgence of antiplutocratic politics was
about far more than elite mismanagement of the macroeconomy.6 On
the campaign trail, Trump framed his critique of postcrisis ﬁnancial
regulation as part of a larger and darker narrative of Wall Street capture

2. David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 626 (2014)
[hereinafter Grewal, Laws of Capitalism].
3. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). We discuss Citizens United infra section III.B.
4. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2014); see also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18
Theoretical Inquiries L. 61, 61 (2017) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered]
(“Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century . . . at once produced and symbolized
a new public awareness of economic inequality.”).
5. Grewal, Laws of Capitalism, supra note 2, at 626.
6. For a well-sourced, if contested, history of the ﬁnancial crisis’s management by
U.S. officials, see generally Ron Suskind, Conﬁdence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and
the Education of a President (2011). For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between U.S. politics and international political economy during the crisis years, see
generally Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World
(2018).
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and American decline.7 “Pikettymania”8 revolved around the stark neoMarxist claim that “capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and
unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic
values on which democratic societies are based.”9 And from Black Lives
Matter to No More Deaths to #MeToo to Medicare for All to transgender
liberation to the Fight for Fifteen to the Dreamers to the Campaign to
End the New Jim Crow, a wave of social movements have mobilized to
reveal and redress the myriad structures of oppression confronting
particular groups. It is out of this decade of struggle that what we call the
“egalitarian anxiety” has emerged. This anxiety joins the unexpected
traumas of national economic failure and widening economic insecurity
to the all-too-predictable persistence of racial, ethnic, and gender
subordination.
New evidence on the extent of American inequality comes out
constantly. In 1978, the wealthiest 0.1% of American households held 7%
of the nation’s wealth.10 By 2012, that number had more than tripled.11
Today, the richest 160,000 or so families in the United States possess as
much wealth as the 144 million poorest families combined.12 Between the
top 0.1% and the bottom 90%, there stands what the Atlantic recently
dubbed “The New American Aristocracy”: “a well-behaved, ﬂannel-suited
crowd of lawyers, doctors, dentists, mid-level investment bankers, M.B.A.s
with opaque job titles, and assorted other professionals.”13 These aristocratsby-degree account for the majority of American wealth, more than the
top 0.1% and the bottom 90% put together.14 And while the institutions
and communities that rear the new aristocracy often define themselves in
terms of merit and cultural pluralism, the class they are reproducing is in
fact a bastion of white power. “African Americans represent 1.9 percent of
the top 10th of households in wealth; Hispanics, 2.4 percent; and all other
minorities, including Asian and multiracial individuals, 8.8 percent—even
7. See Rebecca Berg, Trump’s Wall Street Picks Clash with Populist Campaign,
RealClearPolitics (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/12/01/trumps_
wall_street_picks_clash_with_populist_campaign_132473.html [https://perma.cc/FFF8-7C97];
Adam Thorp, As Warren Says, Trump Is No Fan of Post-Crisis Wall Street Regulations, PolitiFact
(July 5, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jul/05/elizabethwarren/warren-says-trump-no-fan-post-crisis-wall-street-r [https://perma.cc/A594-SKEG].
8. Alan S. Blinder, ‘Pikettymania’ and Inequality in the U.S., Wall St. J. (June 22,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/alan-blinder-pikettymania-and-inequality-in-the-u-s-1403477052
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
9. Piketty, supra note 4, at 1.
10. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. Econ. 519, 520 (2016).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 520–21, 551–52.
13. Matthew Stewart, The 9.9 Percent Is the New American Aristocracy, Atlantic
(June 2018), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/the-birth-of-a-newamerican-aristocracy/559130 [https://perma.cc/D3FV-Y9GB].
14. Id.
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though those groups together account for 35 percent of the total
population.”15 The median net worth of a white family in the United
States is $134,000, versus $11,000 for the median black family.16 In Boston,
home to the greatest density of higher education institutions in the
country,17 the median net worth of a nonimmigrant black household is $8.18
There is a certain irony to this profusion of data on inequality, in
that it is mainly manufactured and read by the new aristocracy itself. Yet
this privileged group has ample reason to worry as well. Competition
within the 9.9% is ﬁerce, and only the highest ranks can comfortably
absorb the rising costs of education, healthcare, housing, and environmental security that intraclass competition helps to produce.19 Meanwhile,
every elite has something to fear from the social breakdown that such
costs may precipitate when populations simply cannot pay, or are forced
to pay in more gruesome currencies.
Accordingly, a solidarity of fear—however partial or impermanent—
has taken hold. It is under these conditions that the egalitarian anxiety
becomes an almost inescapable motivation for conscious and conscientious legal thought. To dub our moment the age of inequality would
require the fabrication of too many golden ages to count. But it is indeed
an age of profound positional and distributional anxiety, an age when
enduring, escalating, and intersectional forms of inequality have become
a central object of legal study and reform.
* * *
In less than ten years, the egalitarian anxiety has made inroads across
the legal academy. One of the most dramatic manifestations is the economic
turn in constitutional theory and history, as the Great Recession stirred a
number of scholars to diagnose these ﬁelds’ persistent neglect of considerations of economic justice,20 and to begin to rectify that neglect. Today,

15. Id.
16. Dedrick Asante-Muhammad et al., Inst. for Policy Studies & Prosperity Now, The
Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing Out America’s Middle
Class 6 (2017), http://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Road-to-Zero-Wealth_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKH6-794L].
17. Denis M. McSweeney & Walter J. Marshall, The Prominence of Boston Area
Colleges and Universities, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 2009, at 64, 67.
18. Ana Patricia Muñoz et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., The Color of Wealth in
Boston 20 tbl.9 (2016), http://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/color-of-wealth/
color-of-wealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5Q2-JLR5].
19. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Tailspin: The People and Forces Behind America’s FiftyYear Fall—and Those Fighting to Reverse It 17–46 (2018); Daniel Markovits, Yale Law
School Commencement Address: A New Aristocracy (May 2015), http://law.yale.edu/system/
files/area/department/studentaffairs/document/markovitscommencementrev.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HCY3-64V6].
20. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in
Constitutional Theory, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1445, 1466–94 (2016).
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the relationship between constitutional law and economic inequality—or
“constitutional political economy” more broadly21—represents one of the
most generative subjects of constitutional scholarship, supplanting to some
extent the legal-liberal preoccupation with describing and defending variants of living constitutionalism.22 While the economic turn in constitutional
scholarship is particularly stark, considerations of social and material inequality have also galvanized research in fields more accustomed to thinking
about the economic side of power. These include administrative law,23
antidiscrimination law,24 antitrust law,25 banking law,26 consumer law,27 corporate law,28 criminal law,29 employment law,30 environmental law,31 family law,32

21. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, and the
Constitution of Opportunity, in Wealth: NOMOS LVIII 45, 46 (Jack Knight & Melissa
Schwartzberg eds., 2017) (emphasis omitted); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of
“Constitutional Political Economy,” 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1527 passim (2016) [hereinafter
Kessler, Political Economy].
22. In the past four years alone, important works on constitutional political economy
have proliferated. E.g., Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming
of Capitalism (2014); Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change,
and the Making of the 1960s (2016); Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitution: From
the New Deal to the New Right (2015); Reuel Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law,
and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Crisis of the
Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic (2017);
Karen M. Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935–
1972 (2016); Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks
and Balances, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 419 (2015); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 669 (2014); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li,
Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 Calif. L. Rev.
323 (2016); Symposium, The Constitution and Economic Equality, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1287
(2016); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 195 [hereinafter Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism].
23. E.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination (2016); David E. Pozen,
Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097
(2017).
24. E.g., Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 Yale L.J. 2 (2018).
25. E.g., Lina Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale. L.J. 710 (2017).
26. E.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, Exploitation, and
the Threat to Democracy (2015).
27. E.g., Anne Fleming, City of Debtors: A Century of Fringe Finance (2018).
28. E.g., Corporations and American Democracy (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J.
Novak eds., 2017).
29. E.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (rev. ed. 2012); James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and
Punishment in Black America (2018).
30. E.g., Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law
in the Neoliberal Era, 92 Ind. L.J. 1059 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the
Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 479 (2016).
31. E.g., Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene 45–50 (2015).
32. E.g., Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality (2015); Emily
J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1983 (2018).
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human rights law,33 intellectual property law,34 labor law,35 and law and
technology.36
And then there is the First Amendment. Following the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis, the Roberts Court handed down a series of rulings that
demonstrated the degree to which the First Amendment can be used to
thwart economic and social welfare regulation—generating widespread
accusations that the Court had created a “new Lochner.”37 The freedoms
of speech, association, and religion have long been touted as the last
nonviolent weapons by which the downtrodden can contest their
subordination.38 But in cases such as Citizens United,39 Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc.,40 Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,41
McCutcheon v. FEC,42 Harris v. Quinn,43 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.44 (the latter three all decided in early to mid-2014, at the height of
33. E.g., Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018).
34. E.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970 (2012).
35. E.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2 (2016).
36. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Construction of
Informational Capitalism (forthcoming 2019) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review);
Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and
Information (2015).
37. Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133 [hereinafter Shanor,
New Lochner]; see also Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism,
116 Colum. L. Rev. 1915, 1917–18 nn.5–8 (2016) [hereinafter Kessler, Early Years]
(collecting sources published from 2011 to 2016 that suggest the First Amendment has
been “hijacked” by antistatist, economically libertarian interests).
38. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970)
(discussing the “safety valve” function of the First Amendment); Steven H. Shiffrin,
Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America 128 (1999) (arguing that dissenters ought
to be put “at the center of the First Amendment tradition” and that the “dissent model” of
the First Amendment “has a strong political tilt against the unjust exercise of power”).
39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down on First Amendment
grounds federal restrictions on corporate “electioneering communications”).
40. 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down on First Amendment grounds a Vermont law
restricting the sale and disclosure of physicians’ prescription records).
41. 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (striking down on First Amendment grounds an Arizona law
awarding “matching funds” to publicly funded candidates for state office whose privately
funded opponents spend over a certain amount).
42. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds aggregate
limits on federal campaign contributions).
43. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds the agencyfee provision of Illinois’s Public Labor Relations Act).
44. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (striking down under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA) federal regulations requiring closely held for-proﬁt corporations to
provide contraceptive coverage for their employees); see also Beckwith Elec. Co. v.
Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (describing RFRA as the First
Amendment’s “statutory corollary”); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional
Anomaly?, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 169, 172 n.11 (2015) (“Hobby Lobby was decided under
[RFRA] but was quasi-constitutional in its reasoning and closely allied with the Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)).
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Pikettymania), the Court seemed to transform those weapons of the weak
into one more resource that wealthy interests could deploy to preserve
their advantages. From this point of view, the Roberts Court not only got
the relevant civil liberties law wrong; it also displayed a reactionary
commitment to using that law to entrench inequality in the face of a
bruising recession.
Four years later, the Roberts Court’s “Lochnerian” application of
civil liberties law continues unchecked,45 leaving students of the First
Amendment with more questions than answers. This introductory Essay
to the Columbia Law Review’s 2018 Symposium, “A First Amendment for
All? Free Expression in an Age of Inequality,” takes up three such
questions:46 Why has First Amendment law become such a prominent site
for struggles over socioeconomic inequality? Do First Amendment theory
and precedent contain egalitarian elements that can be recovered? And
what might a more egalitarian First Amendment look like today? The
latter two questions also motivate the Symposium contributions published
in the pages that follow. While a ﬂurry of recent scholarship has helped
to identify and critique the emergence of a substantively inegalitarian
First Amendment, the search for a constitutionally compelling alternative
has only just begun. Our aim in this Essay is to take stock of how the First
Amendment arrived at this juncture and to sketch a roadmap for the
legal journey ahead.
45. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018) (holding that requiring nonmembers of public sector unions to pay fees
toward collective bargaining violates the First Amendment); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (striking down on First Amendment grounds
a California law requiring pro-life pregnancy centers to provide certain factual
information to patients); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151
(2017) (concluding that a New York law prohibiting merchants from imposing a surcharge
on credit card purchases is a “speech regulation” and remanding to the court of appeals
to determine whether the law violates the First Amendment); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that, “not [for] the ﬁrst time,” the Roberts Court
was “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the
future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”); Adam Liptak, How Conservatives
Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/30/us/politics/ﬁrst-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing Janus and Becerra as “the latest in a stunning run of
victories for a conservative agenda that has increasingly been built on the foundation of
free speech”). There is little cause to believe that the replacement of Justice Anthony
Kennedy with Justice Brett Kavanaugh will derail this trend. See Ken White, You’ll Hate This
Post on Brett Kavanaugh and Free Speech, Popehat (July 10, 2018), http://www.popehat.com/
2018/07/10/youll-hate-this-post-on-brett-kavanaugh-and-free-speech [https://perma.cc/4YVKECBT] (reviewing Kavanaugh’s appellate opinions and concluding that “[p]eople who buy
into the ‘conservatives are weaponizing the First Amendment’ narrative will see him as a
strong [weaponizer], in that he has applied the First Amendment to [invalidate] campaign
finance laws, telecommunications regulation, and other aspects of the regulatory state”).
46. In keeping with the Symposium’s theme, we focus on free expression and largely
bracket First Amendment jurisprudence relating to the freedoms of religion, press,
assembly, and petition.
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I. THE LONG ROAD TO THE ROBERTS COURT
Judicial enforcement of First Amendment rights was once thought to
be among the greenest pastures in the land of legal liberalism—the
ideology that came to dominate the American legal academy in the 1960s
and that sought to defend both the postwar welfare state and its reform
by the Warren Court.47 Yet as explained above, a growing number of legal
liberals have begun to view this pasture as a battleﬁeld on which the most
powerful socioeconomic actors occupy the highest ground.48 Scholars
who share this anxious assessment disagree about the extent to which
First Amendment inegalitarianism should be attributed to long-term
trends in American political economy and civil liberties law or, instead, to
a relatively recent doctrinal and ideological rupture with the past.49
Those scholars who believe such a rupture has taken place, meanwhile,
differ as to its timing. Cases decided by the Roberts Court, the Rehnquist
Court, the Burger Court, and even the Stone Court have been singled
out as the inﬂection point when First Amendment doctrine took its
inegalitarian turn.50 Beneath these debates about causation and chronology, however, lies a set of core propositions affirmed by nearly all
participants: ﬁrst, that there exists an inegalitarian tendency within First
Amendment jurisprudence; second, that this tendency has become ever
more pronounced during the Roberts Court era;51 and third, that First
47. See generally Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy
of Civil Libertarianism (1991); Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism
(1996); Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management
(1995).
48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
49. Compare, e.g., Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at 1922 (arguing that
“contemporary critics of First Amendment Lochnerism have overstated the phenomenon’s
novelty and understated the economically libertarian tendencies that may be intrinsic to
judicial enforcement of civil liberties”), with Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation:
How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, New Republic (June 3, 2013),
http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation
[https://perma.cc/CMM6-UPJY] [hereinafter Wu, Right to Evade] (arguing that the “coopting of the First Amendment” has been enabled by “a new generation of conservative
judges, who have repudiated the judicial restraint their forebears prized”).
50. Potential candidates include Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
444 U.S. 620 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Lathrop v. Donohue,
367 U.S. 820 (1961); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); and Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). For further discussion of this chronology, see Kessler,
Early Years, supra note 37, at 1917–22, 1992–2002.
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453,
1455–57 (2015); Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U. Chi.
Legal F. 513, 533–35; Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, Democracy (Winter
2012), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v-america [https://
perma.cc/GK6U-5LGM]; Wu, Right to Evade, supra note 49; Joseph Fishkin & William E.
Forbath, Constitutional Political Economy When the Court Is to the Right of the Country,
Balkinization (June 28, 2018), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/constitutional-political-
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Amendment inegalitarianism is particularly potent in the economic
realm.
A.

First Amendment Lochnerism

It is thanks to this third proposition that egalitarian anxieties about
the First Amendment have come to be spelled out in the language of
“Lochnerism.” By invoking the Supreme Court’s 1905 ruling in Lochner v.
New York,52 legal theorists and practitioners suggest that today’s First
Amendment jurisprudence serves a function similar to the early twentieth century’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.53 In both cases, the
argument goes, we see the federal courts using a select set of individual
rights to protect the privileges of the economically powerful and to resist
legislative and executive efforts to advance the interests of the economically marginal. Lochnerism provides a particularly vivid trope, or heuristic,
with which to criticize judicial decisions that entrench economic
inequality.54
economy-when.html [https://perma.cc/H85Q-D6J8]; cf. Lee Epstein et al., 6+ Decades of
Freedom of Expression in the U.S. Supreme Court 9 (2018), http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/FreedomOfExpression.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS3C-WZ5A] (finding empirically
that “[e]ven as the Roberts Court has decided a smaller number of expression cases than
its predecessors, it has accepted signiﬁcantly more petitions in which the government (or
some other body) suppressed conservative expression”).
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Invocations of Lochnerism generally connote not just the
Lochner ruling but a series of Fourteenth Amendment cases decided during the ﬁrst
Gilded Age, including Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897).
53. For judicial uses of the Lochner analogy, see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 591–92, 602–03 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,
693 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). For scholarly uses and defenses of the analogy,
see, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 323, 323–26 (2016) [hereinafter Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment];
Sepper, supra note 51, at 1459–507; Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 183–92; Purdy,
Neoliberal Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 196–203. As Professor Leslie Kendrick
describes the contemporary constitutional landscape:
[L]itigants claim immunity from laws regulating commercial conditions
such as employee safety and beneﬁts; the location and organization of
businesses; the composition and labeling of foodstuffs, drugs, and
commercial products; and the treatment of customers. These claims
mirror Lochner-era claims in their structure: they posit a constitutional
right, held by business interests (be they sole proprietors or corporate
entities), which immunizes them from government regulation, often
regulation that relies upon state interests in public health, safety, and
welfare.
The difference today is that the First Amendment is so often the
designated vehicle for these antiregulatory impulses.
Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1199, 1207–09
(2015) [hereinafter Kendrick, Expansionism] (footnotes omitted).
54. Lochner comparisons have long served as a rhetorical strategy for anathematizing
disfavored judicial decisions. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379,
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While shaped by the historical analogy to a previous Gilded Age, the
discourse of First Amendment Lochnerism does not focus exclusively on
the economy. An aggressive, libertarian First Amendment, it is increasingly recognized, has the potential to crowd out egalitarian norms across
the social ﬁeld, propagating inequalities of sex, gender, race, and religion along with inequalities of ﬁscal and cultural capital. Proponents of
the Lochner analogy thus invoke or allude to it when criticizing a wide
range of deregulatory First Amendment decisions. For example, the use
of civil libertarian arguments to undermine antidiscrimination law has
been identiﬁed by several scholars as a particularly worrisome form of
modern-day Lochnerism.55
Nonetheless, the problem of economic power remains central to the
discourse, a testament to the trauma of the Great Recession as well as to
the growing popularity of the view that economic inequality intersects
with and reinforces other forms of inequality. From the black–white
wealth gap and residential segregation to the special burdens that socially
conservative employers impose on their female employees’ access to
reproductive health care, debates over economic inequality have become
seemingly inextricable from debates over racial and sexual inequality.
The use of the First Amendment to affirm or advance any combination
of these inequalities is liable to earn the Lochnerian epithet among
today’s legal liberals.
Some may ﬁnd this epithet to be excessive. It is probably a stretch to
claim that First Amendment law plays as direct a role in entrenching
economic inequality today as substantive due process and equal
protection law did in the Lochner era. On the other hand, there is a good
deal of evidence that our conventional picture of the Lochner era is itself
overdrawn: that the federal judiciary at the turn of the twentieth century
was actually quite accommodating of new regulatory schemes aimed at
ameliorating economic distress, upholding the vast majority of such
schemes as valid uses of the states’ police powers or the federal
government’s Commerce Clause authority.56 This Essay is not the place to
417–22 (2011). In many instances, the implied critique is simply that judges have
overstepped their proper role, substituting their personal policy preferences for those of
democratic majorities. Within the scholarly discourse of First Amendment Lochnerism,
however, the comparison tends to be more substantive, criticizing not only imperious
judges but also the programmatic use of individual rights to achieve deregulatory
outcomes that favor well-capitalized parties. See Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at
1917–25, 1992–2004. The use of the term “Lochnerism” more or less as an antonym of
“egalitarianism” elides any number of historical and conceptual complexities, see sources
cited infra note 56, but it remains a central feature of this discourse.
55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1205 (2014); Sepper, supra note 51; Nelson Tebbe,
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 25 (2015).
56. See generally David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner : Defending Individual
Rights Against Progressive Reform (2011); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998); Howard Gillman, The
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hash out this historical dispute. Suffice it to say here that perception goes
a long way in the law. The egalitarian critiques that currently swirl around
cases like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, and Janus may one day be taught
together with—and enjoy the same cachet as—the classic legal-realist and
progressive critiques leveled against cases like Allgeyer, Adair, and Lochner.
Whatever the future may bring, it is instructive to ask where the
language of First Amendment Lochnerism comes from. Why have free
expression and free exercise cases come to be linked with these longburied due process and equal protection cases? Why is First Amendment
doctrine increasingly seen as our “Lochner,” our symbol of law’s complicity
in plutocracy?
B.

The Rise and Fall of Progressive Civil Libertarianism

The answer to these questions becomes slightly less mysterious in
light of recent revisionist scholarship on early twentieth-century civil
liberties law. According to the revisionists, the “traditional” model of civil
liberties law as the judicial enforcement of individuals’ noneconomic
rights against state interference was itself a rightward departure from the
progressive civil libertarianism of the initial decades of the twentieth
century. Prior to World War II, revisionists maintain, the progressive
lawyers, administrators, and activists who ﬁrst championed federal
protection of civil libertarian rights did so in the hope of building a more
economically just, culturally pluralistic society.57 Such a society would be
typiﬁed by a strong labor movement; by a powerful but porous
Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence
(1993); Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts: Substantive Due
Process and Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 275 (2013).
57. Signiﬁcant works of revisionism include Megan Ming Francis, Civil Rights and the
Making of the Modern American State (2014); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil
Rights (2007) [hereinafter Goluboff, Lost Promise]; Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil
Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law (2004);
Sam Lebovic, Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America
(2016); Victor Pickard, America’s Battle for Media Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate
Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform (2014); Laura Weinrib, The Taming of
Free Speech: America’s Civil Liberties Compromise (2016) [hereinafter Weinrib, Taming
of Free Speech]; John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of
American Law (2007); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–
1920, in 2 The Cambridge History of Law in America 643 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern
Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (2014) [hereinafter Kessler, Administrative
Origins]; Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the
Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Karen M. Tani, Welfare
and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 Yale L.J. 314
(2012); Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297
[hereinafter Weinrib, Outside the Courts]; Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s
Hard when You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts, 42 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 367 (2008); and Carrie DeCell, Note, Deweyan Democracy and the Administrative
State, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 580 (2011).
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administrative state, continually solicitous of and transformed by public
participation; and by the privileging of collective welfare over individual
interest. Federal courts—the inveterate guardians of private property and
persecutors of organized labor—had little role to play in this vision.
Instead, its proponents focused their energies on administrative and
legislative enforcement of civil liberties, especially the liberties of workers, political dissenters, and vulnerable minorities.58 Free expression and
federal regulation were seen as complementary tools in the struggle for
socioeconomic equality. This vision achieved its fullest embodiment in
the design, staffing, and early operation of New Deal agencies such as the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), and the Civil Liberties Unit of the Department of
Justice (DOJ).59
By portraying early twentieth-century civil libertarianism as a
relatively statist, collectivist, and labor-oriented project, revisionist
scholarship helps to clarify the institutional and ideological roots of
today’s First Amendment Lochnerism. For if the revisionist story is
correct, then before the First Amendment could be Lochnerized, it had
to be judicialized, individualized, and shorn of its prolabor bias.
According to the revisionists, this is exactly what began to happen in the
mid-to-late 1930s, as a coalition of conservative lawyers and businessmen
took aim at those aspects of the administrative state most indebted to the
progressive civil libertarian cause, such as the NLRB.60 In a conscious
58. Not all of those legal and political activists who considered themselves both “progressive” and “civil libertarian” would have agreed with every aspect of this summary
account. In particular, the more radical proponents of sexual freedom and labor selfmanagement tended to be less trusting of the administrative state as a vehicle of reform;
they also occasionally scored victories in the courts. See, e.g., Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex
Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the Changing Face of Free Speech, 30
Law & Hist. Rev. 325, 326–27 (2012) (describing litigation campaigns against the regulation of birth control and “obscene” speech); see also Weinrib, Outside the Courts, supra
note 57, at 312–15 (noting that “Communists and other radicals who opposed [the
National Labor Relations Act] framed their objections as civil liberties concerns” and that
this framing inﬂuenced the lobbying of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)). The
presence of this dissenting bloc within the progressive civil libertarian coalition highlights
the popularity and success that the more statist and court-skeptic fractions enjoyed during
the 1930s.
59. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and
the New Deal 8–11, 51–73 (1966) (discussing the NLRB’s ideology); Susan L. Brinson, The
Red Scare, Politics, and the Federal Communications Commission, 1941–1960, at 5–59
(2004) (discussing the FCC’s progressive origins and the inﬂuence of “New Deal liberalism” on early FCC policies); Goluboff, Lost Promise, supra note 57, at 111–24 (discussing
the formation and leadership of the Civil Liberties Unit); see also Weinrib, Outside the
Courts, supra note 57, at 304 (explaining that “New Deal reformers who called for active
intervention in the economy also . . . advocated adjustments in the marketplace of ideas to
correct distortions stemming from inequality of access or relative power” and generally
“sought to implement that vision in spite of, rather than through, the courts”).
60. See generally Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech, supra note 57, at 226–310; Kessler,
Early Years, supra note 37, at 1925–36; Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016
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attempt to wrest the civil libertarian banner from the New Deal’s
progressive wing, this coalition argued that the administrative state, both
at the national and local level, had become a threat to free expression
and association, imposing ideological conformity on everyone from
street preachers to corporate lobbyists.61 The obvious, if hyperbolic,
parallels were Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.62 To check such
“administrative absolutism,” the new civil libertarians called for the
reassertion of judicial power—in particular, for vigorous judicial
protection of every individual’s rights to free expression and procedural
due process, without regard to his or her relative economic power or
substantive political goals.63
Despite the anti–New Deal origins of the new civil libertarianism,
several factors in the late 1930s conspired to make it attractive to a
growing number of moderate lawyers and politicians as well. Particularly
troubling to these on-and-off New Dealers was President Franklin
Roosevelt’s 1937 campaign for judicial reorganization and executive
consolidation, a campaign fatefully launched just as the American
economy slipped back into recession and the New Deal’s left ﬂank
championed an unpopular strike wave in the automobile industry.64 Such
domestic upheaval looked even more ominous in light of the brutal
programs of fascist and communist social reform then sweeping
Europe.65 To curtail the more “totalitarian” tendencies of administrative
governance while affirming the basic legitimacy of the New Deal, the
mainstream legal community engineered a sort of Solomonic compromise,
in which civil libertarian rights to free expression, political participation,
religious liberty, and procedural due process were both hailed as a shield
against bureaucratic domination and sharply distinguished from rights to
economic liberty.66 The former, noneconomic rights were to be guarded
jealously by the federal judiciary. The latter, economic rights were to be

Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
52–62 (2017).
61. See Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech, supra note 57, at 271.
62. See Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges
in America, 1900–1940, at 125–27, 137 (2014); see also Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 750 n.137 (2016) [hereinafter Kessler,
Administrative Legitimacy] (collecting sources on the deployment of this analogy).
63. E.g., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep.
A.B.A. 331, 343–68 (1938).
64. See Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945, at 139,
154–58 (1983); Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy
over Executive Reorganization, 1936–1939, at 55–78 (1966).
65. See Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics
Since the New Deal 18 (2012); Karl, supra note 64, at 168; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The
New Deal and the Origins of Our Time 173–82 (2013).
66. See generally Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 177–233
(1999); Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 757–73; Weinrib, Outside the
Courts, supra note 57, at 348–60.
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entrusted largely to Congress and the President, who would calibrate and
recalibrate them in the interests of national prosperity and security.
Today, we associate this redistribution of individual rights and
institutional responsibilities with Footnote Four of Carolene Products.67
And that footnote is indeed a gnomic testament to the “liberal
compromise”68 (as Professor Laura Weinrib has labeled it) that, in 1938,
was gradually displacing progressive civil libertarianism. The work of the
most moderate Republicans on the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the footnote represented
their effort to negotiate the extremes of irresponsible conservative
antistatism and irresponsible progressive collectivism.69
It may seem odd to think of the advent of bifurcated review as the
ﬁrst step toward First Amendment Lochnerism. Carolene Products’
hallowed distinction between civil liberty and economic liberty is
precisely what First Amendment Lochnerism is said to erode.70 Yet the
liberal compromise of the late 1930s and early 1940s established many of
the conditions, or preconditions, that would later enable First
Amendment Lochnerism to thrive. It rescued the courts from decades of
left-wing critique, recasting them as classless custodians of universal
values. By the same token, it elevated the judiciary above the
administrative state as the ultimate bulwark of republican selfgovernment. The once reactionary framing of the administrative state as
an intrinsic threat to personal freedom and private ordering—rather
than the only institution capable of securing a competitive economy and
fair society—was more or less accepted across the legal profession.
Finally, the liberal compromise “neutralized” the theory and practice of
civil libertarianism, transforming a ﬁeld that had been identiﬁed, above
all, with workers’ rights to organize, picket, and strike71 into a set of
formal limitations on what democracy could demand of any individual or
group. As the liberal compromise became the new orthodoxy, admitting
considerations of economic power into free speech analysis began to feel
more like pollution than pragmatism to the champions of bifurcated
review.

67. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
68. See generally Laura M. Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and
the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (May 1, 2011) [hereinafter Weinrib, Liberal Compromise]
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=other_publications (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). This felicitous term captures the political defeats that produced midcentury
“liberalism.”
69. Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at 1925–56.
70. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional
Revolution, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1452, 1471–72 (2015) (discussing the ways in which legal liberals contrast bifurcated review with Lochnerism).
71. Weinrib, Outside the Courts, supra note 57, at 297.
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The empowerment of the federal courts, the suspicion of administrative governance, and the insistence on formal neutrality in the enforcement of civil libertarian rights all smoothed the way for the co-optation of
the First Amendment by the economically powerful. If the liberal compromise did not more quickly devolve into First Amendment Lochnerism,
historical contingencies account for much of the delay. For instance, the
political composition of the midcentury judiciary, dominated by a decade’s worth of Roosevelt appointees, limited extensions of the First
Amendment in obviously inegalitarian directions.72 At the same time, a
relatively bipartisan embrace of the logic of Cold War kept the most
rabid critics of public spending and regulation on the constitutional margins. Antistatism, whether right wing or left wing, was difficult to square
with the ﬁscal and institutional demands of “competing” with the Soviet
Union for global hegemony.73 Just as these factors slowed the drift toward
First Amendment Lochnerism, they also help explain the real attractions
of the liberal compromise. In a period of rapid economic growth and
declining economic inequality,74 that compromise offered left-leaning
lawyers a principled basis for resisting racially discriminatory state and
72. See Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts’
Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 9 Am.
B. Found. Res. J. 285, 323–27, 341–43 (1984) (describing the unprecedented role that
judicial ideology and policy considerations played in President Roosevelt’s Article III
nominations following the Senate’s rejection of wholesale judicial reorganization in July
1937). More than two-thirds of Roosevelt’s Article III appointments—130 out of 193 total,
including all nine Supreme Court appointments—occurred during the post-court-packing
phase of his presidency. See Biographical Directory of Federal Article III Judges, 1789–
Present, Fed. Judicial Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/5GWSLMFM] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). Nor did New Deal policy preferences cease to inﬂuence the bench after Roosevelt’s death. Between Harry Truman’s elevation to the presidency in 1945 and the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, pro–New Deal Democrats
(Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) appointed 443 Article III judges,
while the sole Republican President during those years (Dwight D. Eisenhower) appointed
182. Id. It was during this period that presidential ideology displaced the traditional
politics of party patronage as the dominant inﬂuence on the judicial appointment process.
See David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of
Supreme Court Nominees 1–19 (1999) (describing this new pattern of ideological inﬂuence); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1064–80 (2001) (identifying presidential selection of federal judges on
an ideological basis as the chief vehicle of “partisan entrenchment” in post–New Deal
constitutional law).
73. See Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s AntiStatism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy 69–75 (2000) (discussing the “stable strategic
synthesis” that emerged from ideological tensions between anticommunism and antistatism in the wake of World War II); Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of
National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism 4–8 (2010) (elaborating
on the partisan political aspects of this dynamic).
74. See David Singh Grewal, Closing Remarks: Law and Inequality After the Crisis, 35
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 337, 338–39 (2016) (discussing the “exceptional period” of widely
shared growth from roughly 1945 to 1975 and listing the “superlatives” by which it is
known in various countries).
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local laws while moderating two of the most threatening aspects of Cold
War political culture: the repression of dissenting voices in the name of
national security and the rollback of the welfare state in the name of the
free market. The conditions of moderation, however, began to erode in
the 1970s, as the New Deal generation dwindled, the postwar economic
boom petered out, and inﬂation made deregulation and austerity
increasingly bipartisan commitments.75 Those commitments, moreover,
would no longer be checked to the same degree by arguments from
national security, as failure in Vietnam precipitated a leaner and less
visible national security state.76 All three branches of government shifted
rightward.77
While this shift was underway, the Burger Court’s commercial
speech,78 campaign ﬁnance,79 and religious funding 80 decisions elicited a
brief ﬂurry of scholarship warning of—or celebrating—the erosion of the
distinction between civil and economic liberty.81 It was at this moment
that anxieties about “Lochnerization” of the First Amendment ﬁrst
surfaced in the law reviews.82 Cases in which “individuals or groups
commonly thought of as ‘conservative’ took up the First Amendment
cudgels against regulatory forces supported by individuals or groups
commonly thought to be ‘liberals’” began to multiply in the late 1970s
and 1980s, both in the economic realm and beyond.83 Yet when all was
said and done, the Burger Court’s transformative First Amendment
jurisprudence did surprisingly little to dislodge scholarly support for the
75. See id. at 339 (“Starting in the 1970s and 1980s—and continuing through to
today—inequality reasserted itself, with increasing vigor . . . .”); see also Judith Stein, Pivotal
Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies, at ix–xxii
(2010) (describing both parties’ rejection of midcentury political economy).
76. See Zelizer, supra note 73, at 234–36 (describing the politics of this change in
grand strategy).
77. See Michael J. Graetz & Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the
Judicial Right 1–10 (2016) (describing the rightward shift in the courts); Laura Kalman,
Right Star Rising: A New Politics, at xviii–xxi, 353–66 (2010) (describing the rightward
shift in the political branches).
78. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
79. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
80. E.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
81. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 384 [hereinafter Balkin, Some Realism];
Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30–33 (1979); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1387–88 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 81, at 30–31; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s
Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 883–84 (1987).
83. Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 935, 941 (1993).
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liberal compromise. During the Rehnquist Court years, from 1986 to
2005, the legal academy generally continued to treat the distinction
between civil and economic liberty as sacrosanct, a precious fragment of
the crumbling New Deal constitutional order, and spoke rarely about the
dangers of First Amendment Lochnerism.84 Such faith would be sorely
tested by the Great Recession.
II. INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM, THE INFORMATION STATE,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT–INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
If Lochnerian currents were always swirling just beneath the surface
of postwar First Amendment law, over the past decade they have ﬂooded
the legal landscape. The timing of this ﬂood may seem strange from a
strategic perspective. With Americans facing high unemployment, collapsing wages, and mounting household debt in the late 2000s, considerations of institutional legitimacy presumably counseled against bold
judicial experiments in deregulation. The contemporaneous “rediscovery”85 of economic inequality by the mass media and mainstream policymakers cast these experiments in an especially harsh light. One does not
need to read Piketty, however, to guess that equating corporations’ rights
to spend money, sell data, and trim beneﬁts with citizens’ First
Amendment rights might prove controversial in a world of bank bailouts
and mortgage foreclosures. Why did the Court choose such an unpropitious moment to take a wrecking ball to the already-unstable boundary
between freedom of expression and freedom from economic regulation?
One answer might be that it was only shortly before the ﬁnancial
crisis that the Court gained the necessary votes to do so. Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor and Chief Justice William Rehnquist had long resisted the
expansive approach to deﬁning and protecting commercial speech
favored by their successors, Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice John
Roberts.86 When O’Connor retired in late 2005, the original vision of the
liberal compromise went out the door with her. By the end of the George
84. But cf., e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 Utah L.
Rev. 659, 661 (“The First Amendment . . . has become the locus of a new Lochnerism—or
rather, a revival of the old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal label.”); Morton J. Horwitz,
The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 109–16 (1993) (critiquing
the “Lochnerization of the First Amendment” since the end of the Warren Court). A 2006
symposium in the Northern Kentucky Law Review brought sustained attention to “First
Amendment Lochnerism” for the first time in years. See generally Symposium, First
Amendment Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation
of Non-Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 365 (2006).
85. See generally Grewal & Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, supra note 4.
86. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the
Rehnquist Court, 93 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1049 (2005) (observing that in commercial speech
cases in which the Rehnquist Court engaged in “Lochner-izing under the guise of the First
Amendment,” the “more pro-government view [was] taken by Justices Rehnquist,
O’Connor and Breyer”).
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W. Bush Administration, the conservative legal movement had ﬁnally
produced a Supreme Court majority sufficiently committed to First
Amendment Lochnerism—or sufficiently indifferent to its inegalitarian
effects—to risk popular backlash in the midst of a recession.
However plausible this electoral explanation may be, ﬁxating on
judicial personalities risks obscuring deeper connections between the
political economic structure of the First Amendment disputes the Roberts
Court has confronted and the deregulatory doctrines it has crafted. Recent
scholarship on the political economy of our digital age suggests several
factors that may have helped to catalyze First Amendment Lochnerism in
the present period.87
To begin with, transformations in the capitalist system have imbued
more and more economic activity with communicative content. The Roberts
Court’s tenure has coincided with an “ongoing shift from an industrial
mode of development to an informational one,”88 a shift that has radically
reconfigured the processes, products, and personnel through which
capital is accumulated and commodities are created and exchanged.89
Synthesizing the insights of economists, political scientists, social theorists,
and technologists, legal scholar Julie Cohen highlights two “fundamental
transformations” bound up with our relatively recent passage from a
predominantly industrial to a predominantly informational economy:
First is a movement away from an economy oriented principally
toward manufacturing and related activities toward one oriented
principally toward the production, accumulation and processing of information. In an information economy, the mass model
of production that emerged in the industrial era is itself increasingly
redirected toward development of intellectual and informational
goods and services, production and distribution of consumer
information technologies, and ownership of service-delivery
enterprises. Second is a transformation in the conduct of even
traditional industrial activity. In an information economy, information technology assumes an increasingly prominent role in

87. As with all bodies of scholarship touched on in this Essay, we cannot remotely do
justice here to the breadth or depth of this literature. Prominent book-length examples
include Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom (2006); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies:
Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (2009); Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (2006); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (2015); Pasquale, supra note 36;
Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (2017); and Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The
Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads (2016).
88. Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 369, 370 (2016) [hereinafter Cohen, Regulatory State].
89. See generally 1 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The
Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (2d ed. 2000); Dan Schiller, How to
Think About Information (2007).
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the control of industrial production and in the management of
all kinds of enterprises.90
Following sociologist Manuel Castells,91 Cohen identiﬁes these
developments with the rise of “informational capitalism.”92 Two years into
the ﬁnancial crisis, political theorist Jodi Dean arrived at a similar
diagnosis, warning of the rise of “communicative capitalism.”93 Whatever
one calls it, this emergent mode of capitalist organization is not
restricted to those “new” sectors of the economy focused on the creation
and exchange of data. Rather, the creation and exchange of data suffuse
the manufacturing and service sectors as well.94 There, the relative speed
and accuracy of communication among managers, producers, and
consumers become keys to maximizing return and minimizing risk.
These developments make it increasingly difficult to separate
economic activity from expressive activity—and thus to maintain the
distinction at the heart of the liberal compromise. A great deal of
economic activity has long had some sort of communicative dimension.
But as the locus of proﬁt-making migrates from the production,
accumulation, and processing of material goods to the production,
accumulation, and processing of information (usually in digital form),
the creation and circulation of information, as such, assumes a far more
prominent role in the economy while the metaphor of information
assumes a far more prominent role in the culture. Doing business in the
twenty-ﬁrst century means dealing with data, and because “data is
expressed in alphanumeric symbols, it certainly looks a lot more like
traditional speech” than, say, making steel or plowing a ﬁeld.95 In turn,
the standard justiﬁcation for affording First Amendment protection to
commercial speech—that it serves the interests of listeners in making

90. Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 88, at 371 (footnote omitted).
91. See 1 Castells, supra note 89, at 18–21 (deﬁning “informational capitalism”).
92. Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 88, at 370–71, 414.
93. See generally Dean, supra note 87. As with other social theorists grounded in
historical materialism, Castells, Cohen, and Dean do not assume a sharp break between
one “mode of production” and another (whether from feudalism to capitalism, or
industrial capitalism to informational capitalism). See, e.g., Cohen, Regulatory State, supra
note 88, at 371 (noting that “the relationship between industrialism and informationalism
is not sequential, but rather cumulative, and the emergence of informationalism as a
mode of economic development is powerfully shaped by its articulation within capitalist
modes of production”). The term “informational” or “communicative” capitalism is best
understood as marking a change in the activities and technologies most essential to proﬁtmaking in a given social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production. Cf.
Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism 59–77 (1980) (discussing how a
single, historically delimited social formation may exhibit variety both within and across
modes of production).
94. See, e.g., Louis Columbus, Ten Ways Big Data Is Revolutionizing Manufacturing,
Forbes (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2014/11/28/tenways-big-data-is-revolutionizing-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/9Z7X-HPRH].
95. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 59 (2014).
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informed decisions—expands to include the interests of commercial
actors in imparting, or withholding, valuable information.96
An additional feature of informational capitalism extends the potential reach of First Amendment Lochnerism: the dominant role played by
private owners of the platforms through which information circulates
online and within which ever more data is commodiﬁed and mined for
economic value. Even though they control the infrastructure of digital
communication and function as the “new governors” of the digital public
sphere, companies like Facebook and Google are generally assumed to
not be bound by the First Amendment because they are not state actors.97
Instead of empowering users to challenge their policies, the First
Amendment empowers the companies themselves to challenge statutes
and regulations intended to promote antidiscrimination norms or users’
speech and privacy, among other values.98 First Amendment law not only
fails to check the internet’s new governors and the inequalities that
pervade their platforms99 but also stands in the way of legislative and
administrative correctives.
The old governors, meanwhile, face an additional set of civil
libertarian obstacles as the “neoliberal” turn in public administration has
gradually substituted the management of information for the policing of
conduct. Neoliberalism, as the term is used here, refers to an ideology
96. See, e.g., id. at 87 (arguing based on a “right to create knowledge” that “direct
regulations of data should draw [First Amendment] scrutiny”); see also Heather Whitney,
Knight First Amendment Inst., Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy 3–
7 (2018), http://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Heather_Whitney_Search_
Engines_Editorial_Analogy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J36-AGCX] (describing the largely
successful efforts of technology companies to analogize the decisions they make about
their platforms to the editorial judgments made by publishers, for purposes of claiming
First Amendment protection); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19
(2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech] (“[B]usinesses argue [that] regulation of the
distribution network is a regulation of the freedom of speech of the network owner,
because the network owner ‘speaks’ through its decisions about which content to favor
and disfavor.”).
97. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1610–11, 1658–59 (2018).
98. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Political Economy of Freedom of Speech in the Second
Gilded Age, Law & Pol. Econ. (July 4, 2018), http://lpeblog.org/2018/07/04/thepolitical-economy-of-freedom-of-speech-in-the-second-gilded-age [https://perma.cc/B9KQMR8D] (“The First Amendment . . . may be a potential obstacle to laws that would try to
regulate the owners of private infrastructure to protect freedom of speech and privacy.
One example would be ﬁrst amendment attacks on network neutrality. A second would be
ﬁrst amendment defenses against privacy regulations . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Olivier Sylvain, Knight First Amendment Inst., Discriminatory Designs
on User Data 3, 8–16 (2018), http://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/
Sylvain_Emerging_Threats.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU5V-WBRC] (describing numerous
ways in which “online engagement [is] more difficult for children, women, racial
minorities, and other predictable targets of harassment and discriminatory expressive
conduct”).
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and mode of governance that favors “the imperatives of market economies . . . deployed to further capital accumulation” over “nonmarket
values grounded in the requirements of democratic legitimacy.”100 The
neoliberal preference is not necessarily for “free markets” in any strict
sense, but for a regulatory environment that prioritizes “familiar
protections of property and contract” along with “a favorable return on
investment and managerial authority.”101 In our digital age, the
facilitation of these preferences has fallen to the “information state,” the
set of national (or international) bureaucracies that oversee the
operations of informational capitalism.102 Within these bureaucracies,
“mandates or bans on conduct”—such as traditional labor laws, wage and
price controls, or licensing regimes—are apt to be rejected as overly
market-disruptive and replaced whenever possible with “‘lighter-touch’
forms of governance . . . such as disclosure requirements” and other
regulatory techniques that further the production and circulation of
commercially salient information.103 As Professor Amanda Shanor has
detailed, one effect of this trend is to make today’s regulations “more
prone to appear speech-regulating” and, hence, more vulnerable to First
Amendment challenge.104 Whereas banning or taxing most commercial
practices (for instance, the use of “conﬂict minerals”) is unlikely to raise
any First Amendment issues under existing law, requiring ﬁrms to
publish information pertaining to these practices (for instance, through

100. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 2–3.
101. Id. at 3. The fusion of Cohen’s two “fundamental transformations”—the predominance of information as both (1) a commodity and medium of exchange and (2) a
means of managing production and exchange—is most fully achieved in the ﬁnancial
services sector. There, securitization enables the reduction of almost any perceived inefficiency to another piece of saleable information. Scholars from across the academy have
identiﬁed this primacy of ﬁnancial services, underwritten by the ease of securitization in
the digital marketplace, as a key feature of neoliberalism. See, e.g., David M. Kotz,
Financialization and Neoliberalism, in Relations of Global Power: Neoliberal Order and
Disorder 1, 1 (Gary Teeple & Stephen McBride eds., 2011) (“A common view is that the
rise of neoliberalism is explained by the growing role and power of ﬁnance in the political
economy of capitalism.”); Marc Lavoie, Financialization, Neo-Liberalism, and Securitization,
35 J. Post Keynesian Econ. 215, 215, 225–31 (2012) (discussing the “generalization of
securitization” and its role in neoliberal economic theory and the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis).
102. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 163; cf. Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent:
The Wars for the Twenty-First Century 85–90 (2008) (describing the ongoing transition
from twentieth-century industrial “nation states” to contemporary informational “market
states”).
103. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 137, 165; see also David E. Pozen, Transparency’s
Ideological Drift, 128 Yale L.J. 100, 123–59 (2018) [hereinafter Pozen, Ideological Drift]
(discussing, in connection with neoliberalism, the turn toward transparency requirements
and away from “substantive” regulation in the United States over the past several decades).
104. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 164, 171.
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regular reports on their mineral sourcing) may give rise to claims of
unconstitutionally compelled speech.105
At the same time that it makes economic regulation more
susceptible to First Amendment scrutiny, the turn toward “lighter-touch”
governance saps such regulation of much of its redistributive potential.
From the standpoint of individuals lacking in market expertise or capital
endowments, these new forms of governance can be perverse. Not only
do they fail to produce the levelling effects of traditional regulatory mechanisms aimed at labor–capital parity, but disclosure mandates and the like
also often end up “hurting the people [they] purport[] to help” by lulling consumers into complacency, insulating compliant companies from
antifraud liability, and undercutting political will for more substantive
policy measures.106 In other words, the same “informational” focus that
exposes neoliberal governance to civil libertarian challenges from regulated parties also tends to set internal limits on the equality-enhancing
capacities of the administrative state.
Just beyond the formal boundaries of the informational state and
the informational marketplace lies a ﬁnal set of institutions that contributes to contemporary Lochnerism: nonproﬁt, nongovernmental organizations dedicated to First Amendment advocacy. As the First Amendment’s
deregulatory potential has become more evident, the economic surplus
enjoyed by wealthy ﬁrms and executives has increasingly fed back into
such organizations. Dissenting Supreme Court Justices107 and mainstream
media outlets108 called attention this past Term to the “weaponization” of
the First Amendment by a well-funded network of advocacy groups, such
as the Alliance Defending Freedom, the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, the Institute for Justice (IJ), the Liberty Justice Center, and the
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (NRWLDF). The
efforts of these groups follow in the mold of, and build upon, the highly
effective campaign to advance commercial speech rights that business

105. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(partially invalidating under the First Amendment a 2012 Securities and Exchange
Commission rule requiring ﬁrms using conﬂict minerals to disclose their origin); see also
Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment, supra note 53, at 339–51 (explaining that claims
of “compelled speech” have become a key tool for proponents of a deregulatory, antilabor
First Amendment).
106. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 651 (2011); see also Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 103, at 135–41
(elaborating on these points).
107. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 45; Dahlia Lithwick et al., Kneecapping Unions and
Weaponizing the First Amendment, Slate (July 2, 2018), http://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/07/janus-becerra-masterpiece-cakeshop-the-supreme-court-terms-big-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/HRY6-KLLJ].
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interests have been leading since the 1970s.109 Over the past two decades,
nonproﬁts dedicated to religious freedom have joined the fray, sometimes supported by the same donors who fund commercial speech advocacy as well as parallel campaigns against legal protections for organized
labor.110
Within the broader conservative legal movement that has arisen
since the 1970s,111 there now exists, then, something of a First Amendment–
industrial complex. Mapping the contours of this complex is well beyond
the scope of this Essay. The basic point, for present purposes, is that
arguments for a deregulatory First Amendment are now promoted not
only (or even primarily) by for-proﬁt companies seeking to minimize
their own labor costs or regulatory burdens, but also by a growing set of
nominally depoliticized nonproﬁts with varying degrees of connection to
the business community.
In this regard, a critic of First Amendment Lochnerism may have
cause to worry about the establishment, within the past year alone, of
numerous First Amendment clinics and centers at law schools around the
country.112 Organized as public interest law ﬁrms or as 501(c)(3) “public
109. See Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment, supra note 53, at 325–31; Shanor,
New Lochner, supra note 37, at 155–63. The 1970s commercial speech campaign itself built
upon the midcentury efforts of wealthy conservative activists, such as Cecil B. DeMille, who
helped to create a network of nongovernmental organizations committed to the legal
expansion of economic, religious, and expressive freedom. See generally Brinson, supra
note 59, at 61–140; Kevin M. Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate America
Invented Christian America 27–34, 127–61 (2015); Lee, supra note 22, at 56–78, 115–32;
Pickard, supra note 57, at 75–96.
110. The Koch brothers, for instance, have supported the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, IJ, and NRWLDF, among many other groups active in the First Amendment area.
See Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of
the Radical Right 178 (2016) (IJ); Jay Riestenberg & Mary Bottari, Who Is Behind the
National Right to Work Committee and Its Anti-Union Crusade?, Huffington Post (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-bottari/who-is-behind-the-nationa_b_5451743.html
[https://perma.cc/6MK5-25TQ] (NRWLDF); Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Spirit and the
Law: How the Becket Fund Became the Leading Advocate for Corporations’ Religious
Rights, Am. Prospect (June 18, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/little-known-force-behindhobby-lobby-contraception-case [https://perma.cc/LQN3-5MAK] (Becket Fund).
111. See generally Jefferson Decker, The Other Rights Revolution: Conservative
Lawyers and the Remaking of American Government (2016); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of
the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008); Joseph Fishkin
& David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 915, 951–59
(2018). Recent scholarship on the history of right-to-work laws, corporate religious liberty,
and federal communications regulation suggests that some of the foundations of the
conservative legal movement and its First Amendment–industrial complex began to be
laid several decades earlier. See supra note 109.
112. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, First Amendment Clinic Coming to Vanderbilt Law,
Concurring Opinions (Jan. 12, 2018), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/
01/fan-173-2-first-amendment-news-first-amendment-clinic-coming-to-vanderbilt-law-full-timedirector-sought.html [https://perma.cc/Z98X-TTSH]; Cornell Law School Announces Launch
of New First Amendment Clinic, Cornell Law Sch. (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.lawschool.
cornell.edu/spotlights/first-amendment-clinic.cfm [https://perma.cc/S79W-8258]; Powell to
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charities,” these centers and clinics will not engage in electioneering or
do any substantial amount of legislative advocacy.113 Instead, they can be
expected to do what such nonproﬁts usually do: bring lawsuits seeking
access to government records or seeking to strike down government
policies under the Constitution. Even if some of these centers and clinics
are staffed by liberals who aim to defend the downtrodden,114 the
proliferation of First Amendment–focused organizations risks further
exacerbation of “First Amendment expansionism”115 and further
degradation of the state’s ability to regulate, to better or worse effect, on
behalf of the public interest.116
* * *
Against this historical and institutional backdrop, any robust
response to First Amendment Lochnerism must grapple with the many
ways in which the First Amendment tends to entrench socioeconomic
inequality. We have called attention to a set of economic, political,
technological, and legal developments that, over the past half century,
have combined to make First Amendment litigation and ideology a ﬁeld
of struggle that overwhelmingly favors the interests of large employers
and well-educated professionals in the private sector (as well as the upper
echelons of the national security bureaucracy in the public sector, a topic
we lack the space to address117). Not only does the contemporary First
Lead New First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law, Duke Law News (Feb. 7, 2018), http://
law.duke.edu/news/powell-lead-new-first-amendment-clinic-duke-law [https://perma.cc/V3B26NHJ]; Karen Sung, ASU Law Establishes First Amendment Clinic with Gift from Stanton
Foundation, Ariz. State Univ. (Dec. 13, 2017), http://campus.asu.edu/content/asu-lawestablishes-first-amendment-clinic-gift-stanton-foundation [https://perma.cc/RXD4-8R9W]. One
of us (Pozen) served this past year as the inaugural visiting scholar at Columbia University’s
Knight First Amendment Institute, which was established in 2016.
113. The Knight First Amendment Institute, for instance, is organized under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See Press Release, Knight Found., ACLU’s
Jameel Jaffer to Direct Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (June 29,
2016), http://www.knightfoundation.org/press/releases/aclus-jameel-jaffer-direct-knightﬁrst-amendment [https://perma.cc/Y5W4-P5PJ]. Accordingly, it may not “participate . . .
or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office” or devote a “substantial part of [its] activities” to “attempting[] to inﬂuence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
114. See, e.g., G.S. Hans Joins Vanderbilt’s Law Faculty as an Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law Sch. (Aug. 15, 2018), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/gautamhans [https://perma.cc/CR5Q-WW7F] (quoting the incoming director of Vanderbilt’s
new First Amendment clinic as expressing a “particular[] interest[] in representing
vulnerable populations who may need help in asserting their speech and assembly
rights”).
115. Kendrick, Expansionism, supra note 53, at 1200, 1210–19.
116. Cf. infra section IV.A (elaborating further on the risk that “maximalist” First
Amendment arguments advanced for progressive purposes will ultimately fuel First
Amendment Lochnerism).
117. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s
Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 2 (2009)
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Amendment landscape give the high ground to those already rich in
ﬁnancial and cultural capital, but it also places numerous obstacles in the
path of wage laborers and undercapitalized social groups—groups whose
free expression and association might otherwise serve as tools of
collective self-protection and advancement.
As this grim appraisal makes clear, the search for an egalitarian First
Amendment is well and truly a search: an inquiry, both practical and
theoretical, into the very possibility of a First Amendment jurisprudence
that would advance the expressive and associational interests of the
socioeconomically disadvantaged.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
How might this inquiry proceed? A natural place to begin the search
for a more socioeconomically egalitarian First Amendment—a First
Amendment that alleviates, or at least does less to aggravate, the “egalitarian anxiety” sketched in this Essay’s introduction—is with normative
theories of free speech.118 The Free Speech Clause itself is notoriously
unhelpful. Neither its text119 nor its drafting history120 sheds much light
on contemporary controversies. In the absence of interpretive input
from such sources, judges and scholars have produced a vast body of writing that seeks to justify, critique, and shape First Amendment doctrine in
light of foundational principles and aspirations—above all, the pursuit of
(explaining that courts assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims “increasingly
permit government to control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing this
speech as the government’s own,” and “also increasingly consider government workers to
be speaking as employees even when away from work”); David E. Pozen, The Leaky
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of
Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 515 (2013) (explaining that under existing First
Amendment doctrine “the government has expansive legal authority to prosecute
employees who leak” national security information to the media).
118. Again, this Essay, like the Symposium of which it is a part, focuses on questions of
free expression to the neglect of other aspects of First Amendment law. See supra note 46.
119. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Yet hardly anyone reads the Amendment to
apply only to Congress, and since the early twentieth century “principles of free
expression have taken hold in a way that has become detached from—and may never have
been all that securely connected to—the words of the First Amendment.” David A. Strauss,
The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2015).
120. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 9 (4th ed. 2014)
(“Unfortunately, the incomplete materials concerning the legislative history of the
Amendment shed little light about just what was meant by freedom of speech and of the
press.”); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting
Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 Const. Comment. 43, 53 (2007) (stating that
“most scholars agree” that “the original meaning of the First Amendment . . . is—at best—
indeterminate or unhelpful”); cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (“The framers seem to have had no
coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the
subject.”).
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truth, the promotion of individual autonomy, and the facilitation of democratic self-government.121 The canonical theories of free speech, one
might assume, should help us get some purchase on the egalitarian anxiety, whether by suggesting ways in which the inegalitarian aspects of First
Amendment law might be challenged and alternative doctrines developed, or by supplying reasons why this body of law’s subordination of
substantive equality interests to negative liberty interests is defensible or
maybe even unavoidable.
A.

Truth, Autonomy, Democracy . . . and Equality?

In point of fact, however, the leading theories of the First Amendment
prove indecisive when confronted by the egalitarian anxiety. Democratic
theorizing about free speech may seem at ﬁrst glance to offer the most
hospitable terrain for egalitarian projects and autonomy theorizing the
least, insofar as the former prioritizes communal goods while the latter
prioritizes individualistic ideals. And indeed, First Amendment theorists
who emphasize democratic deliberation and decisionmaking have been
more likely, on balance, to take socioeconomic inequalities into account.
Yet none of the leading theories of free speech has been able to generate
clear or consistent guidance about how such inequalities ought to bear
on constitutional analysis, for several reasons.
First, truth-seeking, autonomy-promoting, and democracy-facilitating accounts of free speech (as well as related accounts that focus on tolerance, dissent, and so on) tend to be formulated in highly abstract and
depoliticized terms. This allows them to apply to a wide range of situations
and to appeal to a wide range of groups—no one is “against” truth, selfactualization, or self-government—but also to be invoked by very different jurists in support of very different outcomes.122 Alexander Meiklejohn’s
democratic theory of free speech, for example, has been “embraced all
along the political spectrum, from Robert Bork to William Brennan,”123
and deployed to defend both exceptionally narrow conceptions of First

121. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, First Amendment Cosmopolitanism, Skepticism, and
Democracy, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 705, 714 (2015) (describing these as “the principal American
First Amendment free speech theories or justiﬁcations”); see also Yotam Barkai, Note, The
Child Paradox in First Amendment Doctrine, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1414, 1429 n.90 (2012)
(“Because the text is inherently unhelpful and the original understanding of free speech
has limited utility, judges and scholars have generally referred to these three theories
[advancing truth, facilitating democratic self-government, and promoting autonomy, selffulﬁllment, and self-realization] in analyzing First Amendment problems.”).
122. Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1826–41 (2016) (explaining why
“depoliticized” legal theories are especially susceptible to co-optation and reformulation
over time).
123. Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 2 (1996).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249794

1980

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:1953

Amendment review124 and expansive proposals for the redistribution of
speech rights.125 Moreover, it is now widely appreciated that the pursuit
of truth, the promotion of individual autonomy, and the facilitation of
democratic self-government are best understood as partial and overlapping—rather than comprehensive or mutually exclusive—theories of free
speech,126 which creates additional play in the normative joints.
Second, the indeterminacy of abstract First Amendment theories is
compounded by empirical uncertainty about the real-world effects of
different speech arrangements. All the leading theories assume a certain
causal relationship between speech rules and social outcomes. They posit
that expressive practices, when structured appropriately, can generate
more knowledge, better debate, greater self-realization, or the like. For
the most part, however, these claims are not grounded in any wellworked-out social theory, and good evidence of the validity of the
assumed causal relationships is sparse to nonexistent. Although it has
long been asserted, for instance, that an “open marketplace of ideas” is
more likely to distinguish truth from falsity than a regime based on epistemic paternalism, in which authorities categorize ideas as true or false,
the existing empirical research offers little support for this assertion.127
Empirical results on the impact of various antitrust and media regulations on the diversity of ideas “have been similarly mixed.”128 The relevant
124. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 120, at 20 (arguing on “democratic” grounds that First
Amendment “protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political” and
not to “any other form of expression”).
125. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405,
1415 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure] (arguing that a “commitment to rich
public debate will allow[] and sometimes even require the state” to adopt policies that
“make certain all views are heard,” however “repressive” such policies “might at ﬁrst
seem”).
126. See Farber, supra note 120, at 8–10; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1212, 1283 (1983); Lawrence B. Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 859,
859–60 (2000).
127. See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1160, 1163 (2015) (“[A] considerable amount of existing empirical
research . . . tends . . . to justify skepticism about the causal efficacy of establishing an open
marketplace of ideas in identifying true propositions and rejecting false ones.”); cf.
Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897, 910–11 (2010)
(“[T]he persistence of the belief that a good remedy for false speech is more speech, or
that truth will prevail in the long run, may itself be an example of the resistance of false
factual propositions to argument and counterexample.”). As Vincent Blasi has explained,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in introducing the market metaphor, did not intend to
endorse the pursuit of truth as the overriding aim of free speech or neutral proceduralism
as a model of regulation. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39–40 (“[O]ne must appreciate how far [Holmes] was from a modern
procedural liberal concerned more about the right than the good . . . . The cultural/
intellectual/political combat facilitated by free speech is, in Holmes’s vision, messy,
unpredictable, often nasty, and impossible to domesticate.”).
128. Ho & Schauer, supra note 127, at 1165 n.16.
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dependent variables (truth, democratic discourse, personal autonomy)
are hard to specify and to measure, and they may be inﬂuenced by
countless factors apart from formal speech rules. When it comes to the
central prescriptive dilemma raised by the egalitarian anxiety—the
degree to which its alleviation requires government planning—the
leading theories of free speech therefore have less to offer than one
might expect.
Finally, truth-seeking, autonomy-promoting, and democracy-facilitating theories of free speech are ambiguously positioned vis-à-vis the
egalitarian anxiety because while none of these theories foregrounds
“equality” as a desideratum, none rejects it either. For example, the
preeminent autonomy advocate Professor Martin Redish is happy to
concede that equality is “an important element of free speech theory,” as
“[t]he equality principle has a long and venerable tradition in First
Amendment theory and doctrine.”129 The equality principle that Redish
has in mind, however, is a version of viewpoint neutrality: the proposition
that “[a]ll viewpoints must have an equal opportunity to compete in the
intellectual marketplace, free from selective governmental regulation.”130
Explicitly rejected are other versions of an equality principle, more in
tune with the concerns of this Symposium, that might entail “increasing
the pre-speech resources of the economically inferior speakers or limiting the economically superior speakers’ ability to employ their resources
for expressive purposes.”131 As Redish’s discussion reﬂects, equality claims
are made by free speech theorists of all stripes and on both sides of the
same questions. Accordingly, debates over whether and how free speech
law should respond to present inequalities are prone to take place within
an already capacious, ill-deﬁned, and internally riven egalitarian tradition
of First Amendment theorizing.
B.

The Example of Campaign Finance Regulation

Perhaps no area better illustrates the inadequacy of high-level First
Amendment theory for negotiating the egalitarian anxiety than campaign
finance law. Cases such as Citizens United v. FEC 132 and McCutcheon v. FEC 133
have been at the heart of the emerging critique of First Amendment
Lochnerism. They raise the question whether the Free Speech Clause
permits a legislature to limit the election-related spending of corporations,
129. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 282
(1998). A generation earlier, Professor Kenneth Karst argued influentially that the “principle
of equal liberty of expression underlies” each of the three major theories of the First
Amendment. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 23 (1975).
130. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 129, at 283.
131. Id.
132. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
133. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
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unions, or wealthy individuals in the service of antiplutocratic goals. To
help answer this question in the face of mixed precedent and negligible
Founding-era evidence, the Justices have adverted to each of the three
major normative theories of the First Amendment.
Writing for the Court in Citizens United, Justice Anthony Kennedy
contended that the restrictions on corporate “electioneering communications” imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002134
(BCRA) were simultaneously undermining the pursuit of truth, individual autonomy, and democratic deliberation, as corporate speech contributes importantly to all of these values. According to Kennedy, such
restrictions “interfere[] with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected
by the First Amendment”;135 impair “the freedom to think for ourselves”;136
“deprive[] the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice”;137
and distort “an essential mechanism of democracy” and “enlightened
self-government.”138 Various amici on the side of Citizens United appealed
similarly to truth, autonomy, and democracy.139 Justice Kennedy further
contended that the design of BCRA reﬂected an impermissible
government preference for certain categories of speakers (natural
persons) over others (corporations and unions).140 As Professor Genevieve
Lakier observes in her essay for this Symposium, the majority opinion
aggressively claimed the mantle of egalitarianism.141 It just adopted a
highly formalistic, anticlassiﬁcationist conception of expressive equality,

134. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (codiﬁed as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (2012)).
135. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
136. Id. at 356.
137. Id. at 340–41.
138. Id. at 339; see also id. at 360 (asserting that any appearance of special political
“inﬂuence or access” for corporate speakers “will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy”).
139. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Paciﬁc Legal Foundation in Support of
Appellant on Supplemental Question at 11–17, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205),
2009 WL 2349017 (citing “the pursuit of truth,” “responsive democratic government,” and
the “values of self-realization, personal and cultural development, autonomy, and
autonomous decision-making” as reasons to strike down limitations on corporate
electioneering).
140. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“We ﬁnd no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain
disfavored speakers.”); cf. Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 935, 940 (2011) (describing the Citizens United Court as taking “steps to dismantle the
First Amendment ‘caste system’ whereby whether someone or some group could speak
depended on who or what they were”).
141. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118
Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2130–31 (2018).
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similar to Redish’s notion of equality as freedom from “selective
governmental regulation.”142
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Citizens United,
meanwhile, argued just as vigorously that BCRA’s restrictions on
corporate electioneering enhanced the pursuit of truth, individual
autonomy, and democratic deliberation. These restrictions, in Stevens’s
telling, did not impinge upon anyone’s autonomy or self-expression, and
on the contrary they reduced the risk that a “corporation’s electoral
message” would “conﬂict with the[] personal convictions” of the individuals associated with the corporation.143 At the same time, these restrictions
reduced the risk that corporations would “distort public debate” and
stymie the search for truth by “cow[ing]” politicians “into silence,”
“drowning out . . . noncorporate voices,” and “dimish[ing] citizens’
willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.”144 These
arguments, too, were familiar from the First Amendment literature.
Nearly three decades earlier, Judge Skelly Wright sought to show that “all
of the leading ﬁrst amendment rationales may be comfortably reconciled
with campaign spending reforms,” because regulation that limits
spending by wealthy interests “enhances the self-expression of individual
citizens who lack wealth,” preserves “the truth-producing capacity of the
marketplace of ideas,” and “prevent[s] mutilation of . . . communal
thought processes.”145 Like Judge Wright before him, Justice Stevens
connected these claims to a substantive and, in Lakier’s terms,
antisubordinating vision of expressive and political equality.146
Both the majority and the dissent in Citizens United thus plausibly
invoked each and every one of the three major First Amendment
theories, as well as the value of equality itself, in support of their dueling
positions. The result is a vivid demonstration of how the abstraction and
depoliticization, lack of empirical grounding, and underspeciﬁed
embrace of equality that characterize these theories sap them of the
power to sharpen, let alone resolve, the most controversial questions at
the intersection of free speech and political economy. Grand theorizing
about truth, autonomy, and democracy fails to supply meaningful
direction to those seeking a more egalitarian First Amendment. Instead,
142. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 129, at 283.
143. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis omitted).
144. Id. at 469–72.
145. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 636–39 (1982).
146. Lakier, supra note 141, at 2123–27. Justice Stevens did not defend this equality value
by name, relying instead on the language of “anticorruption” and “antidistortion” from
the Court’s earlier opinions. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447–75 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned
Antidistortion Rationale, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 989, 992–1000 (2011) (noting doctrinal and
case-speciﬁc reasons Justice Stevens may not have felt “comfortable embracing the political
equality rationale fully” and explicitly in his dissent).
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those who wish to reverse or offset First Amendment Lochnerism tend to
pursue a set of midlevel conceptual and jurisprudential moves suggested
by the contemporary legal landscape. We turn next to these moves and
the grammar of free speech egalitarianism they have created.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT EGALITARIANISM: A CRITICAL ROADMAP
To appreciate more fully the institutional, ideological, and doctrinal
challenges that egalitarian reformers face today, it is helpful to imagine
the mirror image of First Amendment Lochnerism—that is, the mirror
image of judicial enforcement of negative rights against state action in an
ostensibly neutral, yet materially inegalitarian, manner. The mirror
image of such a regime would look something like early twentiethcentury progressive civil libertarianism, updated for the information age.
As discussed in section I.B, progressive civil libertarians turned to
administrative agencies and sympathetic legislators, rather than courts, to
protect workers, political dissenters, and vulnerable minorities from the
dominance of private employers, bigoted local governments, and
conservative blocs within the national government. Motivating this
project was not an apolitical belief in formal equality or fair play but a
partisan commitment to the creation of a more inclusive, economically
just society. Newly created agencies such as the NLRB, the FCC, and the
Civil Liberties Unit of DOJ saw it as an important part of their mission to
redistribute expressive and associational rights to undercapitalized
groups.
The regulatory approach taken by these New Deal institutions now
seems “off the wall,”147 and not merely because of recent First Amendment
Lochnerism. When the liberal compromise displaced progressive civil
libertarianism in the second half of the twentieth century,148 it ruled out
precisely the kind of civil libertarian activities in which agencies like the
NLRB used to engage. Between its founding in 1935 and 1940, NLRB
administrators openly favored the organizing efforts of those unions they
thought most politically progressive and ethnically diverse (and most
supportive of the New Deal); they scrutinized the speech and assembly of
employees opposed to unionization for interference with the goals of
federal labor law; and they vigorously investigated and sanctioned
employers who expressed anti-union views or issued misleading descriptions of labor law.149 Such employer speech, the NLRB reasoned, was not
147. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge
Went Mainstream, Atlantic (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040
[https://perma.cc/T449-4S97] (“Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers
think are clearly wrong . . . .”).
148. See supra section I.B.
149. See Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 68, at 468–96 (describing the
NLRB’s activities in this period and the cleavage its suppression of employer speech
produced within the nongovernmental civil libertarian community); see also Peter H.
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speech at all within the meaning of the First Amendment.150 Rather,
interpreted in the context of the power that employers wield over
employees’ wages and work conditions, the expression of opposition to
unionization by owners and managers constituted a form of coercion.151
The NLRB’s suppression of employer speech in the name of the civil
liberties of workers went so far as to lead the Board to subpoena local
newspaper editors to determine whether their publication of antiunion—or anti-NLRB—statements had been sought by employers
engaged in nearby labor disputes.152
Through the lens of the liberal compromise, the early NLRB’s
insistent rejection of neutrality when it came to the regulation of
expression and association looks shocking, as do the sheer scope and zeal
of its investigations into anti-union speech, both inside and outside the
workplace. Government viewpoint (and, to a lesser extent, content)
neutrality is a “bedrock principle” of modern First Amendment law.153
The partisan provision of expressive and associational rights by the
political branches to make up for disparities in socioeconomic power
among private parties inverts the contemporary paradigm: judicial
enforcement of such rights against state interference, above all when that
interference seems motivated by a preference for certain classes of
speakers or ideas.
While each feature of this paradigm has been the target of
egalitarian critique or qualiﬁcation, very few commentators have called
for its wholesale abandonment. Especially now, in the midst of the
Trump presidency, elements of the liberal compromise such as judicial
supremacy, content and viewpoint neutrality, and the state action
doctrine strike many on the left as salutary limits on the degree to which
ascendant political movements can dominate civil society. Unfortunately
for egalitarians, these elements also stand in the way of building a
progressive civil libertarian state. Such a state would curtail judicial
review, reject the ideal of formal neutrality when it comes to the
regulation of certain categories of expression and association, and
Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 226–71 (1982) (providing a detailed account of the NLRB’s
early administrative practices); Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 751–54
(discussing political and legal critiques of the NLRB’s progressive civil libertarianism in
the late 1930s).
150. See Joseph K. Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 25 Md. L. Rev. 111, 112–13 (1965); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public
Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 Yale L.J. 2415,
2422–24 (2003) [hereinafter Andrias, Robust Public Debate].
151. See, e.g., 3 NLRB Ann. Rep. 59–62, 125 (1938); 2 NLRB Ann. Rep. 65–66 (1937);
1 NLRB Ann. Rep. 73–74 (1936).
152. See Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 68, at 441–45.
153. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev.
695, 695 (2011); see also, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
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impose speech-redistributive obligations on particularly powerful private
entities. To the extent that these modes of governance are seen by
mainstream legal and political actors as incompatible with a free
democratic society, the strongest historical alternative to First Amendment
Lochnerism—progressive civil libertarianism—will remain off the wall
and off the table.
As a result, today’s progressives generally struggle to achieve a more
egalitarian First Amendment within the doctrinal and rhetorical
boundaries of the liberal compromise. In this Part, we outline the basic
motifs—the transsubstantive themes, tropes, and fault lines—of First
Amendment egalitarian argument. Drawing on both the Symposium
essays and outside writings, we identify three such motifs that recur again
and again in the literature. Together, these motifs constitute something
like a grammar of First Amendment egalitarianism.154 We make no claim
to comprehensiveness or taxonomic rigor. There may in fact be two basic
motifs, or ten. The grammar will undoubtedly change over time in
response to the success or failure of particular ideas; it will also likely feature a host of overlaps and other internal ambiguities, the resolution of
which may prove unnecessary, impossible, or, alternatively, transformative.155 The goal of this Part is not to arbitrate among competing camps
but to clarify the structure of contemporary First Amendment debate and
to give some sense of the argumentative resources—and the limitations of
the resources—available to critics of First Amendment Lochnerism.
A.

Minimalism Versus Maximalism

Before they can arrive at any particular reform proposal, the
threshold question that confronts, and divides, critics of First
Amendment Lochnerism is how powerful they want the judicially enforced
First Amendment to be. This question itself has several dimensions.
Reformers might seek to expand or contract the scope of the First
Amendment’s “coverage,” or the amount of communicative activity that
is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.156 For any given category of
154. For this metaphorical usage of “grammar,” see Grammar, Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/grammar [https://perma.cc/9BVJ-D7EN] (last
visited July 21, 2018) (deﬁning “grammar” as, inter alia, “the principles or rules of an art,
science, or technique,” as in “a grammar of the theater”). For the canonical discussion of
this usage, see Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, at xix (Univ. of Cal. Press 1969)
(1945) (deﬁning a grammar as the “formal interrelationships [that] prevail” among a
given set of “terms . . . by reason of their role as attributes of a common ground or
substance”); id. at 441 (deﬁning a grammar as “an attitude embodied in a method”).
155. See Burke, supra note 154, at xix (emphasizing the need “to study and clarify the
resources of ambiguity” within a grammar, as “it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, transformation would be impossible”).
156. See Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 318, 325
(2018) (“Coverage is a sociological concept: It is not the theoretical or philosophical scope
of the right of free speech, but what litigants and courts in a given historical moment view as
within, or plausibly within, the scope of that right.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The
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covered speech, they might seek to invigorate or enervate this scrutiny
and the First Amendment “protection” that the category receives.157 And
whatever their views on coverage and protection, reformers might seek to
allocate more or less of this enforcement work to the courts. The
overarching issue is whether and to what extent the project of creating a
more socially and economically egalitarian public sphere should be
pursued within or outside judicial enforcement of the First Amendment.
As free speech law has drifted rightward in recent years, many
progressives have become less concerned to get First Amendment
doctrine just right than to get it out of the way. No fewer than four
contributions to this Symposium appeal to such First Amendment
minimalism. After critiquing the neoliberal assumptions that animate the
Roberts Court’s free speech rulings, Professor Jedediah Purdy calls for a
“jurisprudence of permission” that would enable legislatures to pursue
social democratic aims without running afoul of the First Amendment.158
Professor Jack Balkin warns against applying the First Amendment to
social media platforms, and he urges courts to reject free speech
challenges brought by these platforms to “technical, regulatory, and
administrative” measures that would enhance end users’ “practical
freedom,” such as net neutrality rules and media concentration limits.159
Both Professor Leslie Kendrick and Professor Louis Michael Seidman
suggest that First Amendment law is not simply ill equipped to drive
progressive change, but incapable of doing so.160 For all these authors,
judicial enforcement of First Amendment rights will not lead to a more
egalitarian state or society; the best that can be hoped for is to contain
the damage.
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1769–807 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (exploring
possible political, cultural, and economic determinants of First Amendment coverage).
157. The distinction between First Amendment coverage and protection is Professor
Frederick Schauer’s. See Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of
Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 1073, 1075 & n.13 (2017) (discussing the origins of the distinction). For a
particularly recent and concise restatement, see Frederick Schauer, Response, Out of
Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 346, 347–48 (2015), http://
harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/vol128_Schauer.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3MNZ-HSAP].
158. Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2161, 2175–81 (2018); cf. Tim Wu, Knight First Amendment
Inst., Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 19 (2017) [hereinafter Wu, Obsolete], http://
knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim%20Wu%20Is%
20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWN6-FSYJ] (“[T]he project
of realizing a healthier speech environment may depend more on what the First Amendment
permits, rather than what it prevents or requires.”).
159. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2032–33 (2018)
[hereinafter Balkin, Triangle].
160. See generally Leslie Kendrick, Another First Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev.
2095 (2018); Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 Colum. L.
Rev. 2219 (2018).
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The slow but steady growth in judicial coverage and protection of
commercial speech, computer algorithms, and campaign spending161
would seem to support the view that even when First Amendment norms
are crafted with the most egalitarian of intentions,162 they tend to reproduce or intensify the inequalities inherent in a legal system wedded to
the production, exchange, and accumulation of commodities.163 Minimalist responses, accordingly, aim to limit the scope of First Amendment
coverage (as with the argument that algorithms should not be considered
“speech”164), to limit the degree of First Amendment protection (as with the
argument that regulations of commercial speech should be subject to less
demanding scrutiny165), or to avoid legal moves that could inadvertently
invigorate the First Amendment in the future.166 With the First Amendment
thus chastened, legislators and administrators could pursue a broader set
of egalitarian projects. Of course, this gain in freedom to regulate would
161. See Kendrick, Expansionism, supra note 53, at 1200 (discussing “First Amendment
expansionism, where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass ever
more areas of law”); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in Eternally
Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 174, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2002) (discussing “First Amendment opportunism,” whereby free speech doctrine
and rhetoric are asked to serve ends external to “the purposes the First Amendment was
designed to serve”).
162. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (justifying the extension of First Amendment coverage to include
commercial advertising on the ground that a pharmacy’s generic drug ads would help “the
poor, the sick, and particularly the aged” procure medicines at the lowest price).
163. For the commodity-form theory of law, see generally Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law
and Marxism: A General Theory (Barbara Einhorn trans., Ink Links Ltd. 1989) (1924).
For a perceptive summary of Pashukanis’s thought, see China Miéville, The CommodityForm Theory of International Law, in International Law on the Left: Re-examining
Marxist Legacies 92, 105–20 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).
164. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 1169 (2005) (“I believe that most privacy regulation that interrupts
information ﬂows in the context of an express or implied commercial relationship is
neither ‘speech’ within the current meaning of the First Amendment, nor should it be
viewed as such.” (footnotes omitted)); Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. Times
(June 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“[A]s a general rule, nonhuman or automated
choices should not be granted the full protection of the First Amendment, and often
should not be considered ‘speech’ at all.”).
165. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29
Cardozo L. Rev. 2583, 2584 (2008) (critiquing the trend “to offer broader protection to
commercial speech and corporate speakers than has been extended in the past”); Robert
Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 165, 174
(2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/vol128_PostShanor2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3ZJQ-JA55] (criticizing contemporary courts for reviewing regulations of commercial
speech in an “aimlessly intrusive” manner).
166. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1591, 1593–
95 (2016) [hereinafter Andrias, Labor’s Constitution] (describing and defending “the
choice of worker movements not to lay claim to the Constitution” and noting labor lawyers’
fear that “even when workers direct their constitutional claims to elected officials, courts
often end up reviewing—and rejecting—their validity”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249794

2018]

AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT

1989

likely come at the expense of some valuable expression. For progressive
minimalists, however, that tradeoff might well seem worth it, especially to
the extent that judicial enforcement of the First Amendment fails to protect
truly transformative or transgressive speech, as opposed to speech that
poses little threat to legal elites or the socioeconomic status quo.167
This tradeoff will seem especially worthwhile in periods when the
legislative and executive branches are led by progressives. The United
States is, to put it mildly, not in such a period right now. Yet First
Amendment minimalism need not entail a belief that the legislative and
executive branches, simply as a matter of constitutional structure, are
more likely than courts to produce egalitarian outcomes under all social
conditions. Progressive civil libertarians in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century not only sought to free the political branches from the negative
constraint of judicial supervision; they also sought to impose on the
political branches both new institutional forms and a speciﬁc ideological
mission—oriented around values such as democratic pluralism and
individual self-determination—through the operation of a mass political
party committed to that mission and capable of sustaining institutional
innovation.168 Similarly, nothing prevents contemporary First Amendment
minimalists from seeking to coordinate their civil libertarian vision with
the practical pursuit of political power.
Despite the appeals of minimalism, achieving any signiﬁcant rollback of First Amendment doctrine looks like an uphill battle given the
rise of informational capitalism in the marketplace, the First Amendment–
industrial complex in civil society, and First Amendment Lochnerism in the
courts.169 Whether out of conviction or in capitulation, many contemporary
167. As Professor Michael Klarman has observed:
A cynical, though nonetheless apparently accurate, interpretation of the
Court’s free speech jurisprudence is that political dissidents become
entitled to signiﬁcant constitutional protection only when they cease to
pose a serious threat to the status quo—that is, communists and Ku
Kluxers in the second half of the 1960s, but not, respectively, in the
1950s or 1920s. Further, according to this interpretation, the Court
protects the expression rights of pesky but nonthreatening dissidents
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) and of mainstream speakers (labor union
picketers in 1940 but not 1920). Precious little corroboration of the
Court’s countermajoritarian heroics appears in the free speech context.
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 14–15 (1996) (footnote omitted); cf. Andrias, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 166,
at 1609–11 (observing, with reference to First Amendment doctrine, that “the history of
court antagonism toward workers is particularly long and storied”).
168. On the relationship between New Deal administration and the mass party, see
Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 731–34. On the relationship between
progressive civil libertarianism and democracy, see Kessler, Administrative Origins, supra
note 57, at 1084–92.
169. See supra Part II; see also Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 156, at 1789–90 (discussing
“the First Amendment’s magnetism,” its “rhetorical power and argumentative authority,” in
contemporary U.S. political culture); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First
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progressives have offered more maximalist arguments that seek to extend
First Amendment coverage to, or enhance First Amendment protection
of, equality-promoting expressive and associational activities that are
slighted by existing doctrine. In this spirit, Professor Bertrall Ross argues
in his contribution to this Symposium that courts should not only
embrace First Amendment claims against partisan gerrymandering—
claims that have been rapidly gaining traction, especially on the left170—
but also do so in a manner that prioritizes the associational interests of
“political outsiders.”171 Going more against the grain of current case law,
Professor Catherine Fisk argues in her Symposium essay for substantially
greater First Amendment protection for labor picketing and boycotts.172
Not represented in this Symposium are a host of other maximalist
arguments put forward in recent years that seek to enhance social or
economic equality in parts of the expressive landscape. Examples include
proposals for recognizing or strengthening First Amendment rights:
• to register to vote and to cast a ballot;173
• to access government information and facilities (a “right to
know”);174
Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1613, 1614–17 (2015) (cataloguing
“accelerating attempt[s]” in recent years “to widen the scope of First Amendment coverage”).
170. This development itself reﬂects a remarkable expansion of First Amendment
(and contraction of equal protection) advocacy. Cf. Richard Pildes, What Is the First
Amendment Theory of Partisan Gerrymandering?, Election Law Blog (Mar. 25, 2018),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=98319 [https://perma.cc/J9XF-4D7Y] (noting that until
very recently, “references to the First Amendment ha[d] sometimes been thrown in” to
equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering “but never developed in a full
way”). For the most recent judicial statement of support, authored by Justice Elena Kagan
and joined by all three of her liberal colleagues, see Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938
(2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[P]artisan gerrymanders may infringe the First Amendment
rights of association held by parties, other political organizations, and their members.”).
171. Bertrall Ross, Partisan Gerrymandering, the First Amendment, and the Political
Outsider, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2187, 2190–94 (2018).
172. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as
Prologue, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2057, 2076–91 (2018); see also Andrias, Labor’s Constitution,
supra note 166, at 1600 & n.46 (collecting recent sources arguing that the Court should
“interpret the First Amendment’s speech and assembly clauses to give employees greater
rights in organizing campaigns, boycotts, and strikes”).
173. See, e.g., Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 471, 472 (2016) (“This Essay . . . proposes that we ﬁnd a source of constitutional
protection for voting in the First Amendment.”); Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment,
Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 111,
115–16, 141–59 (2013) (advancing a “First Amendment Equal Protection” framework for
strengthening the right to vote and challenging felon disenfranchisement laws); cf.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Under the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment
problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other
things, a form of speech.”).
174. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond:
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95,
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to record the police and other officials performing public duties (a
“right to record”),175 as well as private parties engaged in matters
of public concern;176
to exercise expressive and religious liberties outside the borders
of the United States;177
to feed homeless people;178
to engage in panhandling;179
to access, use, reproduce, and exchange copyrighted or otherwise
privately owned information;180

130–34 (2004) (arguing for First Amendment access rights to administrative proceedings);
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the
People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 Md. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2012) (criticizing courts’ “failure to
acknowledge that the First Amendment ‘right to know’ is a foundational value of our form
of government . . . and the key to interpreting [the Freedom of Information Act]”); see
also Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1025, 1031 (2011)
(urging an “interpretation of the Press Clause . . . that would allow journalists additional
and unique protections, primarily with respect to newsgathering”). Outside the context of
criminal trials, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), efforts to
convince courts to recognize a First Amendment right of access have thus far been
“overwhelmingly unsuccessful,” Frederick Schauer, Positive Rights, Negative Rights, and
the Right to Know, in Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Freedom of
Information 34, 37–38 (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018).
175. See Howard M. Wasserman, Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural
Barriers to Rights Enforcement, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1313, 1337–41 (2018) (reviewing
“scholarly arguments in support of the First Amendment right to record”). At this writing,
a half-dozen federal appellate courts recognize some version of a First Amendment right
to record public officials. See id. at 1336.
176. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the
Video Age, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 991, 1026–62 (2016) (arguing that the First Amendment
should be read to confer a limited privilege to engage in nonconsensual audiovisual
recording on private property when the matters recorded are of public concern).
177. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective:
Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 1020 (2011) (criticizing
“First Amendment parochialism” and advocating a “cosmopolitan” approach that would
make First Amendment rights “generally portable with regard to citizens, and at least
partially portable with regard to aliens”).
178. See, e.g., Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 1616808, 2018 WL 4000057, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (holding that a nonproﬁt
organization’s “outdoor food sharing” with homeless individuals “is expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment”).
179. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, ACLU Targets Panhandling Laws Across the Nation,
Concurring Opinions (Aug. 29, 2018), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/
08 /fan-199-7-first-amendment-news-aclu-targets-panhandling-laws-across-the-nation.html
[https://perma.cc/L9WA-RM84] (collecting sources on the ACLU’s “all out assault on
panhandling laws”).
180. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 412–46 (1999)
(arguing that laws that lead to “enclosure” of the public domain, such as the anticircumvention provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, raise severe First Amendment
concerns); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112
Yale L.J. 1, 5 (2002) (arguing that the “freedom of imagination” guaranteed by the First
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to speak and associate about lawful subjects with organizations
designated as terroristic;181
• for journalists to withhold conﬁdential information from or
about their sources;182
• for executive branch employees to “leak” classiﬁed information
suggesting government error or abuse;183
• to assemble peaceably in public spaces;184 and
• to be free from state surveillance.185
This is by no means a complete list. If they were to succeed (or
succeed to a greater extent than they already have) in the courts, these
sorts of arguments would not dispel the specter of First Amendment
Lochnerism; past trends suggest that the First Amendment’s deregulatory
potential would only grow. But the political valence of First Amendment
case law might begin to tack back toward the left.
Conscious of such tradeoffs, progressive maximalists generally
advance arguments for careful, and highly selective, expansion of the
First Amendment’s reach. The risk of libertarian co-optation and
ideological drift hangs over these efforts.186 If a present inequality could
Amendment “calls into question the enormous and growing set of prohibitions imposed
by modern copyright law on so-called ‘derivative’ works”).
181. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 41 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment forbids the application of a federal statute
criminalizing the provision of “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organizations to “coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations’ lawful
political objectives”).
182. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case
for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 201, 203
(2005) (“[J]ournalists should have a privilege, grounded in the common law and derived
from the First Amendment, to refuse to answer subpoenas issued by judicial authorities.”).
183. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating
First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classiﬁed Information, 6 J. Nat’l Security L. &
Pol’y 409, 411 (2013) (“This article argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, leakers
merit robust First Amendment protections against prosecution.”).
184. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. Rev.
543, 586–89 (2009) (critiquing the turn toward requiring prior permission for such
assemblies and arguing “that the right of assembly should not be collapsed into the right
of free expression”); John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 2,
8 (2017) (arguing that courts and scholars have “erroneously” limited the right of
assembly “to purposes of petitioning the government” and ignored First Amendment
“principles meant to constrain discretionary enforcement by public authorities”).
185. See, e.g., Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to Do the Work of the
First?, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 444, 455 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Abdo_
5czbvbj9.pdf [https://perma.cc/65EU-E7S5] (suggesting that “[c]ourts could simply apply
the First Amendment . . . to surveillance that substantially burdens free speech and
dissent”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 431–34 (2008)
(arguing that government surveillance of conﬁdential communications jeopardizes the
First Amendment value of “intellectual privacy”).
186. Rather than seek to carve out certain categories of speech from First Amendment
coverage or protection, as a minimalist might do, some of today’s progressive maximalists
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actually be rectified through maximalist litigation, however, the normative
cost of allowing it to persist may seem too steep.
The arguments just reviewed generally take as a given the existing
state action doctrine, pursuant to which the First Amendment, like other
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, applies
almost exclusively to government actors.187 As nongovernmental entities
such as Facebook and Google have come to dominate the online
expressive environment, some have proposed the further maximalist
move of directly applying the First Amendment to these companies (or,
more modestly, to certain uses of their digital platforms by government
officials).188 The resurrection and expansion of Marsh v. Alabama,189 a
1946 case in which the Court treated a “company town” as a state actor
for First Amendment purposes, is an idée ﬁxe of this literature.190 Yet
while these proposals are often motivated by a concern about the
amount of power that a small number of technology ﬁrms wield, it is far
from clear that their adoption would serve egalitarian ends. As Balkin
explains, to hold Facebook, Google, and their ilk to the same First
Amendment standards to which we hold public regulators “would quickly
make these spaces far less valuable to end users, if not wholly
ungovernable,” and would signiﬁcantly impair the ﬁrms’ ability to tamp
down on hate speech, harassment, and other forms of antisocial

appear to seek heightened judicial solicitude for the expressive conduct of poor or
otherwise disempowered speakers. The history of First Amendment Lochnerism suggests
the difficulty of convincing courts to recognize any such carve-in and then stabilizing it
across judicial appointments and political economic change. Even if this could be
achieved, however, the result may be hard to reconcile with the principles of content and
viewpoint neutrality, at least as those principles have been articulated in modern doctrine.
See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text; infra notes 213–217 and accompanying
text. The strategic question facing these progressive maximalists is therefore not just
whether they can avoid co-optation and drift, but whether arguments of this sort can be
pursued to any substantial extent within the terms of the liberal compromise—or whether
their success depends, instead, on a reorientation of First Amendment law toward the
pursuit of substantively egalitarian governance.
187. See Klonick, supra note 97, at 1609–13 (summarizing First Amendment state
action doctrine).
188. See generally Whitney, supra note 96, at 24–28 (reviewing recent lawsuits raising
such claims and concluding that “the once off-the-wall theory that these companies should
count as state actors for First Amendment purposes is starting to look a bit more on the
table”).
189. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
190. See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The
First Amendment’s Application—or Lack Thereof—to Third-Party Platforms, 32 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 989, 1025 (2017) (using “Marsh as a foundation” for “a state action theory
suitable for the digital world”); Daniel Rudofsky, Note, Modern State Action Doctrine in
the Age of Big Data, 71 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 741, 777 (2017) (“Facebook is the town in
Marsh v. Alabama. Only it appears to be a virtual town, and Facebook has essentially
created a government over that virtual town. A strong case could be made that Facebook
should be considered a state actor . . . .”).
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expression that disproportionately target women and racial minorities.191
First Amendment doctrine would have to be made much more internally
proregulatory before its direct application to these platforms could
become a net plus for egalitarians.
B.

Speech on Both Sides

First Amendment minimalist and maximalist arguments conﬁne
themselves to the traditional image of Anglo-American public law
adjudication, pitting private right against public authority in a politically
independent court of law.192 Their underlying premise is that egalitarian
ends can be achieved by recalibrating the distribution of constitutional
authority between a private party’s expressive interests and the state’s
legitimate public interests—interests ranging from social welfare to
national security to antidiscrimination. In any given case, minimalist
arguments tend to value the state’s public interests more highly than the
private party’s expressive interests, and accordingly call for narrower First
Amendment coverage or weaker First Amendment protection of the
latter. Conversely, maximalist arguments tend to value certain expressive
interests more highly than the state’s public interests, and accordingly
call for broader First Amendment coverage or stronger First Amendment
protection of the former.
A second genre of egalitarian argument complicates this framework
by introducing a set of interests that neither the private litigant nor the
state necessarily represents. These interests are the expressive interests of
third parties. Whereas minimalist and maximalist arguments focus on the
degree to which the First Amendment should shield a particular party’s
expressive activity from state interference, arguments involving speech on
both sides focus on the degree to which one party’s expressive activity
compromises the ability of other private parties to exercise their own
First Amendment rights.
The generic speech-on-both-sides argument begins by identifying
expressive interests distinct from, and downstream of, the expressive
interests asserted by Speaker X in a First Amendment challenge to state
regulation. The next two steps of the argument are to claim, ﬁrst, that in
the absence of appropriate regulation, the expression of X threatens the
expressive interests of Speakers Y and Z, for example by “chilling” or
“drowning out” the speech of Y and Z; and next, that these threatened
interests are themselves entitled to some degree of First Amendment
solicitude. The ﬁnal step of the speech-on-both-sides argument is to
contend that, when adjudicating X’s constitutional claim, courts should
191. Balkin, Triangle, supra note 159, at 2026.
192. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the
Question of Judicial Review in Inter-War and Post-War England, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 657,
663–76 (2005) (describing the origins and persistence of this traditional image in English
public law).
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take into account the threat that X’s expression poses to the expressive
interests of Y and Z. This might lead a court to devalue speech by X that
tends to silence Y and Z—to accord X’s speech less First Amendment
protection than it might otherwise enjoy.193 Alternatively, judicial
consideration of the immanent conﬂict between the expressive freedom
of X and the expressive freedoms of Y and Z might lead a court to accord
greater weight to the state’s public interests in regulating X. Those public
interests would now include preservation of the First Amendment rights
of Y and Z.194
Whatever the precise form that it takes, the egalitarian goal of the
speech-on-both-sides approach is to promote the positive liberty of those
disempowered speakers who ﬁnd it difficult to vindicate their expressive
interests as First Amendment plaintiffs. Such speakers may suffer legally
not only from a comparative lack of ﬁnancial or cultural capital, but also
from the adversarial, state-versus-society character of public law litigation.
Judicial enforcement of the First Amendment focuses on private parties
with grievances against the state for interfering with (rather than for
failing to enable) their expression.195 Speech-on-both-sides arguments
seek to ameliorate this structural bias by opening the courthouse
windows, so that the struggle for expressive freedom within society can
be heard in the midst of adjudications formally framed as struggles
between regulated speakers and their regulators.
Described in this way, speech-on-both-sides arguments have an impressive, if controversial, pedigree within contemporary First Amendment

193. When the speech-on-both-sides argument takes this form, it can also be described
as a minimalist move insofar as it entails decreasing First Amendment coverage or
protection for a particular kind of speech.
194. Whether or not this should be understood as a maximalist move is a tricky
question. On the one hand, recognizing a strong public interest in preserving the ability of
third parties to exercise their First Amendment rights does amount to greater protection
of those rights. But as a matter of legal form, it is the state’s authority to restrict speech—
speech that suppresses too much other speech—that has been enhanced. Such regulation
of third-party harms would seem to have a surer constitutional footing in the religious
liberty context due to the interplay between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
which forbid accommodations of religion that impose signiﬁcant burdens on the religious
liberty of others. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of
Religion, 49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 343, 356–71 (2014) (reviewing this constitutional
argument). But cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va. L.
Rev. 317, 359–71 (2011) (noting the absence of an Establishment Clause for speech but
suggesting that the Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine might provide a usable
alternative).
195. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights”
First Amendment, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1939, 1943 (2003) (“The present Court, across
the terrain of First Amendment doctrine, treats the freedom of expression and the
attendant freedom of association as private, negative rights intended to shield individual
autonomy against government regulation.”).
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theory.196 Speech-on-both-sides arguments have featured prominently, for
instance, in egalitarian defenses of regulations of pornography on the
ground that pornography silences women and suffocates antipatriarchal
speech;197 in egalitarian defenses of regulations of campaign spending on
the ground that unlimited spending by wealthy interests impedes “the
kind of open public political discussion that the First Amendment seeks
to sustain”;198 and in egalitarian defenses of (and proposals to expand)
copyright law doctrines such as fair use on the ground that overly broad
copyright protections jeopardize the free speech rights of third parties.199
196. Speech-on-both-sides arguments are a subset of what Eugene Volokh calls the
“constitutional tension” method, which asks why any given speaker’s free speech rights
should necessarily trump other constitutional values, including equality interests and the
free speech interests of third parties. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 223 (1996).
According to Volokh, although a constitutional tension approach to the First Amendment
“comes naturally” and can be traced “to the founding of our nation,” it has an
“unfortunate” track record and is “not the approach the Supreme Court generally uses
today.” Id. at 224–25; see also Erica Goldberg, Competing Speech Values in an Age of
Protest, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2163, 2167–68 (2018) (concluding similarly that under current
doctrine “the government generally cannot advance the desire to promote free speech
values . . . as an interest in restricting a private party’s free speech rights”).
197. Major works in this genre include Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing
Women (1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993) [hereinafter MacKinnon,
Only Words]; Alisa L. Carse, Pornography: An Uncivil Liberty?, 10 Hypatia 155 (1995);
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 345 (2014); and Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 293 (1993). For a succinct summary of Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea
Dworkin’s canonical speech-on-both-sides arguments, see Balkin, Some Realism, supra note
81, at 377–78. For MacKinnon’s most recent critique of First Amendment pornography
doctrine, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, The First Amendment: An Equality Reading, in
The Free Speech Century (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., forthcoming 2018)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
198. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 47
(2005); see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 441 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the Constitution does, in fact,
permit numerous ‘restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from
drowning out the many’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring))); id. at 470 (“[W]hen corporations grab up the prime broadcasting
slots on the eve of an election, they can ﬂood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or
no correlation’ to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion of the public
good.” (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)));
cf. Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, a New Court
Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 891, 909 (2007) (“[I]t has long been a
fundamental part of the ‘drowning out’ argument popular in [campaign ﬁnance] ‘reform’
circles that some doors of communication must of necessity be closed in order to open
others.”).
199. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free
speech safeguard[]”); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech,
31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1781, 1793–95 (2010) (summarizing judicial and scholarly arguments
that fair-use expression should receive First Amendment protection); see also Rebecca
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with
Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation,
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Speech-on-both-sides arguments have also made cameos in recent
scholarship defending restrictions on employers’ anti-union speech as a
safeguard of employee expression and association.200 “Behind almost
every restriction on speech,” Professor Erica Goldberg observes in a new
article cataloguing additional examples, “lurks a potential argument that
the lack of a speech regulation may be as deleterious to free speech
values as a proposed speech regulation.”201
The paradigm case of speech-on-both-sides argument concerns hate
speech202—speech that viliﬁes, denigrates, or dehumanizes individuals or
groups on the basis of ascriptive characteristics “such as race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation.”203 The traditional legal term for
such speech is group defamation or group libel, and these categories still
animate hate speech jurisprudence across the globe. In the United
States, however, hate speech regulations have fallen out of favor in
response to a growing judicial consensus that they violate the First
Amendment.204 Existing First Amendment doctrine does permit the
42 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 67 (2000) (using copyright law to illuminate the general First Amendment
problem raised “[w]hen speech interests exist on both sides of an issue”).
200. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why
Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2617, 2660
(2011) (arguing that although federal regulation of employers’ speech during
unionization campaigns “involves restrictions on speech,” these restrictions are justiﬁed in
part because they enhance “employees’ First Amendment associational interests”);
Andrias, Robust Public Debate, supra note 150, at 2432 (arguing for a reframing of “the
free speech paradigm within workplace representation elections as Speech vs. Speech”).
201. Goldberg, supra note 196, at 2165. Goldberg herself is wary of speech-on-bothsides arguments and urges “a formally neutral free speech doctrine” that discounts them,
as “governmental intervention into speech is,” in her view, “far more corrosive than any
private interference or self-censorship.” Id. at 2168.
202. Cf. Volokh, supra note 196, at 224 (suggesting that the “constitutional tension”
approach to the First Amendment has been most fully theorized “with regard to the hate
speech debate”).
203. Craig Martin, Striking the Right Balance: Hate Speech Laws in Japan, the United
States, and Canada, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 455, 455 (2018); see also Alexander Brown,
Retheorizing Actionable Injuries in Civil Lawsuits Involving Targeted Hate Speech: Hate
Speech as Degradation and Humiliation, 9 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2018) (defining the
“opaque idiom” of hate speech in terms of “vituperation (bitter and abusive language) or
vilification (viciously disparaging or insulting language) that makes reference to the victim’s
race, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship status, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity,
disability, or other protected characteristic”).
204. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952), which upheld a state criminal law prohibiting group defamation, has never been
overturned, its validity has been all but ignored for at least four decades. See, e.g., Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (questioning whether Beauharnais “would pass
constitutional muster today”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). For the development of
the American status quo and its position as a global outlier, see Jeremy Waldron, Dignity
and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1596, 1601–02 (2010). For three
foundational efforts to revive the American law of group libel and defamation with respect
to racist speech, see generally Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Charles
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prohibition of speech used to commit a criminal or civil infraction, as
long as the infraction is not itself deﬁned in terms of the expression of a
particular topic or viewpoint.205 It also permits the prohibition of speech
that, in a given context, is so inﬂammatory as to have the force and effect
of otherwise sanctionable physical conduct.206 But typical hate speech laws
do not ﬁt well into either of these categories: They do deﬁne infractions
in terms of the expression of a particular message, and they selfconsciously do not confine their sanctions to speech that causes immediate
physical disruption. On the contrary, the harms that hate speech laws
would most speciﬁcally redress are often those that implicate psychological, dignitary, and expressive interests.
Proponents of such laws have long argued that one of the most
significant costs of hate speech is its tendency to suppress the expressive
and associational activity of vilified individuals and groups.207 As Professor
Mari Matsuda writes: “In order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims
have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes, avoid certain
public places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise
modify their behavior and demeanor.”208 Not only can hate speech
silence individuals in the short term, but both hate speech and the
failure to police it can also lead to the longer-term “disassociation” of
minority groups from the ostensibly democratic political community and
the communicative action essential to its maintenance.209 It is for this
R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
Duke L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989).
205. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–91 (1992) (distinguishing a
narrow yet constitutionally impermissible hate speech law from those categories of speech
that the government may constitutionally prohibit); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (conﬁrming the vitality of R.A.V.’s approach); id. at 2235 (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 2237–38 (Kagan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same).
206. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (indicating that while the
First Amendment generally protects speech that advocates violence, it allows prohibitions
on advocacy that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action”).
207. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 203, at 504 (“[H]ate speech . . . not only distorts the
search for truth, but suppress[es] and silence[s] the voices of the members of the target
minority. Members of the hated group are effectively muzzled and driven from the public
arena and fora of debate . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 467 n.38, 502 n.174
(collecting sources making similar arguments).
208. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2337; see also Brown, supra note 203, at 18–22
(arguing that hate speech makes it more difficult for its targets to communicate in an
effective and self-controlled manner); Delgado, supra note 204, at 146–47 (calling attention to public schools as a key institution in which the censorious dynamics of hate speech
may be particularly acute and destructive).
209. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2337–38. For the canonical “communicative” account
of democratic society, see 1 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action:
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)
(1981). In this spirit, Professor Richard Delgado has suggested that the legal sanctioning

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249794

2018]

AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT

1999

reason that legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron views hate speech
regulation as supporting the public good of “assurance,” or “conveying
to people a sense of security in the enjoyment of their most fundamental
rights.”210 Beyond its immediate targets, hate speech may also impose
expressive and associational costs on “non-target-group members,” costs
that may be of “constitutional dimension” insofar as they fracture or
stultify democratic dialogue.211 More recently, the power of hate speech
to drive vulnerable individuals and groups from the public square seems
to have been magniﬁed by the rise of the platform economy. The
anonymity afforded by digital communications technologies, together
with the speed and scale at which content spreads across the internet,
have combined to create an “unforgiving ecology” of online abuse for
women and other historically subordinated groups.212
As the example of hate speech regulation shows, the failure of
speech-on-both-sides arguments to make more headway in the courts213
has not been for lack of theory or evidence that certain forms of speech
can degrade various other forms of speech. That premise is not much in
dispute. Rather, the failure of such arguments reﬂects both the
substantively libertarian orientation of First Amendment doctrine and
the arguments’ awkward ﬁt with the structure of public law litigation—a
structure that disinclines judges to acknowledge and balance the competing
constitutional interests of private parties.214 Some formulations of speechon-both-sides arguments may also run afoul of the Court’s doctrines
regarding content and viewpoint neutrality, which strongly disfavor laws
that appear on their face to prefer one sort of speech over another (say,
nonhateful speech over hateful speech). These doctrines, as Lakier explains
in her essay for this Symposium, have come to embody a formalistic
conception of “expressive equality” that “limit[s] the effectiveness of the
of hate speech may be necessary precisely because such speech interrupts the normal
functioning of democratic dialogue that might otherwise correct it. See Delgado, supra
note 204, at 147.
210. Waldron, supra note 204, at 1626–30. Only thanks to the provision of such
assurance, Waldron contends, can “people who might otherwise feel insecure, unwanted,
or despised . . . put that insecurity out of their minds and concentrate on what matters to
them in social interaction—its pleasures and opportunities.” Id. at 1629.
211. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2338–39.
212. Sylvain, supra note 99, at 9; see also id. at 10 (discussing Professor Danielle
Citron’s and Professor Mary Anne Franks’s pioneering work on this issue). As Citron
explained nearly a decade ago, the internet enables “bigots” to form “anonymous online
mobs” and engage in numerous communicative activities that “terrorize victims, destroy
reputations, corrode privacy, and impair victims’ ability to participate in online and offline
society as equals.” Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 63–64 (2009).
213. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
214. For a broad comparative critique of U.S. courts’ efforts to avoid the explicit
balancing of rights claims, see generally Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—
Foreword: Rights as Trumps, 132 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
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First Amendment as a tool for protecting the expressive freedom of those
at the bottom of the economic and social hierarchies.”215 According to
these doctrines, the important thing is not that everyone’s speech interests
are recognized and respected; the important thing is that every person,
natural and artiﬁcial, is subject to the same governmental speech rules.
Lakier herself embraces the proposition that the First Amendment
contains a principle of expressive equality, but she observes, crucially,
that the meaning of expressive equality may be construed in a more or
less context-sensitive manner. This observation echoes the classic debate
between anticlassiﬁcation and antisubordination readings of the Equal
Protection Clause.216 Speech-on-both-sides arguments tend to be deeply
concerned with the expressive environment’s egalitarian character, only
they conceptualize equality in more functionalist, materialist, and
dignitarian terms than is typical in First Amendment law.217 From this
perspective, expressive equality is not about treating all speakers the
same. It is about ensuring that all speakers have a more or less equal
opportunity to participate in the public sphere. Lakier’s essay can be
read as a call for a kind of symmetry across the First and Fourteenth
Amendments: Legal liberals who support an antisubordination approach
to equal protection, she suggests, should want judges to incorporate
antisubordination norms into free speech law as well. One way judges
might do this is by giving closer consideration to the expressive interests
of third parties when those interests are directly implicated by the First
Amendment case at hand.
C.

From Speaker to System

Speech-on-both-sides arguments aspire to make First Amendment
law more egalitarian, and less Lochnerian, by acknowledging a wider
range of expressive interests. Compared to the standard method of First
Amendment analysis, these arguments take a relatively broad and
dynamic view as to which speakers matter and which forms of
interference with their speech raise constitutional concerns—looking not
only at speakers whose expression is constrained by state regulation but
215. Lakier, supra note 141, at 2127.
216. See id. at 2121–23. For a precursor to Lakier’s proposed hybridization of free speech
and equal protection, see Charles R. Lawrence III, Cross Burning and the Sound of
Silence: Anti-Subordination Theory and the First Amendment, in The Price We Pay: The
Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography 114 (Laura J. Lederer &
Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (discussing the relationship between antisubordination constructions of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment). For a more general
discussion of “hybrid” and “intersectional” constitutional rights, see Kerry Abrams & Brandon
L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1309 (2017).
217. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Only Words, supra note 197, at 98 (contrasting American
free speech law’s “stupid theory of equality,” which is “indifferent to whether dominant or
subordinated groups are hurt or helped,” with the “more substantive” Canadian approach,
which is “directed toward changing unequal social relations”).
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also at third parties whose expression may be liberated by such
regulation. Yet once one begins to move away from the dyadic, speakerversus-regulator focus of current doctrine, why stop there? Why limit the
analysis to the claims of competing speakers, rather than ask which sorts
of regulation would best serve the expressive environment as a whole? A
ﬁnal set of egalitarian strategies resists the lure of the vexing individual
case and emphasizes instead the importance of examining the system of
free expression at the macro level—attending to the perspective of
listeners as well as speakers, and taking into account the informational
and expressive interests of as many listeners and speakers as practicable.
The First Amendment literature in support of campaign ﬁnance
regulation illustrates how easily speech-on-both-sides arguments can
bleed into systemic arguments of this sort. As noted above, liberal jurists
such as Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Stevens, and Judge Wright have
sought to sustain statutory limits on electioneering expenditures against
First Amendment attack partly on the ground that such limits may
“enhance[] the self-expression of individual citizens who lack wealth.”218
While this argument works in part by identifying the “speech on both
sides” of campaign ﬁnance laws, it does so with reference to a practically
uncountable number of nonwealthy third-party speakers. Furthermore,
these jurists pivot almost immediately to a broader set of claims about
how expenditure limits may also enhance “the truth-producing capacity
of the marketplace of ideas”219 and “the integrity, competitiveness, and
democratic responsiveness of the electoral process.”220 If anything, the
standard legal-liberal defense of the constitutionality of campaign
ﬁnance regulation places greater weight on the interests of listener-voters
than it does on the interests of speaker-campaigners. The fundamental
concern is not that big-money spending will result in the suppression of
ordinary people’s political speech (a difficult-to-prove empirical
proposition). The fundamental concern is that such spending will skew
political discourse, and politics itself, in antidemocratic ways.
Speech-on-both-sides arguments, it turns out, cannot easily be
conﬁned to the courthouse. Their proponents want judges to give
greater weight to the expressive, informational, and dignitarian interests
of third parties who may be negatively affected by a litigant’s First
Amendment victory and therefore to uphold regulations designed to
protect those interests. At least in principle, however, there is little reason
why someone advocating this approach should not also want judges to
give greater weight to the interests of speakers and listeners one step
218. Wright, supra note 145, at 637; see also supra notes 143–145, 198 and
accompanying text.
219. Wright, supra note 145, at 636.
220. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Breyer, supra note 198, at 47 (“Ultimately, [campaign
ﬁnance laws] seek . . . to maintain the integrity of the political process—a process that
itself translates political speech into governmental action.”).
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further removed from any given case.221 More than that, there is little
reason why someone who supports judicially enforced redistribution of
speech rights in the name of the First Amendment should not also want
legislative and executive officials to pursue policies that advance the
expressive, informational, and dignitarian interests of the polity.
Compared to courts, legislatures and agencies are likely to be in a better
position to advance such interests at a wholesale level.
Several strains of anti-Lochnerian First Amendment argument make
just this move from speaker to system—from asking how to deﬁne and
defend speciﬁc types of speech by speciﬁc types of persons to asking how
to engineer a fairer, fuller, “freer” expressive environment for everyone.
Some systemic arguments remain fairly far off the wall, such as those that
militate for a First Amendment right to an adequate education222 or to “a
formal, transparent platform for individual—and, in particular,
minority—voices to participate in the lawmaking process.”223 Systemic
arguments in favor of campaign ﬁnance regulation are comparatively
mainstream. Outside of the campaign ﬁnance context, the systemic
perspective has proven especially popular in the First Amendment
literature on media regulation in its widest sense, what Marvin Ammori
has called the “structure of American communication.”224 Ammori’s
221. Notice in this regard that speech-on-both-sides arguments implicitly acknowledge
listeners’ interests. The claim that certain forms of expression on one “side”
(pornography, hate speech, big-money campaign spending) are liable to undermine
expression on the other “side” (speech by women, vulnerable minorities, the nonwealthy)
depends upon the effects that the former is expected to have on listeners (chilling,
scaring, silencing). The basic concern is that unregulated or misregulated expression at T1
will prevent listeners at T2 from becoming speakers themselves at T3. Even if speech-onboth-sides arguments do not invoke listeners’ interests as such, they tend to assume a
certain causal relationship between the experience of listening and the production of
speech.
222. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education
Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86
Nw. U. L. Rev. 550, 596–602 (1992); Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited:
Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 75, 91–96 (1980); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35
(1973) (noting the appellees’ contention “that education is itself a fundamental personal
right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to
intelligent utilization of the right to vote”).
223. Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1131
(2016). Drawing on a range of historical and political science sources, McKinley’s
innovative article suggests that the Petition Clause might be revived to challenge the
current system of congressional lobbying and the preferential access this system affords to
the politically powerful.
224. Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 10. The
concept of a “structure of communication” usefully complements two other, better
established concepts in twentieth-century social theory: “structure of power” and
“structure of feeling.” On the former, see William F. Grover & Joseph G. Peschek, The
Unsustainable Presidency: Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Beyond 15 (2014) (“There is a
structure of power—‘the very structure and operation of society itself’—that lies
beneath the distribution of governmental powers.” (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The New
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portrayal of this structure relies heavily on physical metaphor, charting a
landscape of “speech spaces” and the legal “architecture” that shapes
them.225 But the broader import of his doctrinal and scholarly overview is
more abstract: A venerable tradition of constitutional theorists has found
the First Amendment to permit or even require the state to take
affirmative steps to secure the expressive and informational interests of
“all Americans,”226 population by population and medium by medium,
from internet to television to telephone to print publishing to city
streets.227
As Ammori emphasizes, his “architectural” approach builds on the
work of leading First Amendment theorists of media regulation,
including Professors C. Edwin Baker, Jack Balkin, Jerome Barron, Yochai
Benkler, Owen Fiss, and Cass Sunstein.228 All of these theorists share a
commitment to affirmative government intervention across a range of
media, whether through ﬁnancial subsidies for the press, a “fairness
doctrine” requiring broadcasters to present opposing views on a controversial issue, “must-carry” rules for cable providers,229 “net neutrality” and
“open access” rules for internet carriers,230 or any number of other
regulatory strategies aimed at creating a more democratic and egalitarian
Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People 19
(1961))); C. Wright Mills, The Structure of Power in American Society, 9 Brit. J. Soc. 29,
32–35 (1958) (describing a “structure of power” as a network of public and private
institutions that determine the real experience of being governed in a given society). On
the latter, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature 131–35 (1977) (describing a
“structure of feeling” as the less-than-conscious attitudes and habits that members of a
given society develop in response to the formal discourses and institutions that constitute
the society’s self-conscious communal life). By analogy, a structure of communication
might be understood as the real experience of speaking and listening in a given polity, as
determined by the interaction of the social, economic, and technological means of
communication and the legal and political governance of those means. Cf. Ammori, supra,
at 21 (describing the practices and principles that “have been core to how Americans
experience their First Amendment protections” (emphasis added)). All three of these
concepts of structure play important roles, whether explicitly or implicitly, in systemic First
Amendment argument.
225. Ammori, supra note 224, passim.
226. Id. at 21.
227. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
933, 936 (2008) (cataloging a historical range of “speech conduits,” from “dead tree”
newspapers to “wireless services”).
228. See Ammori, supra note 224, at 10, 18, 24 (noting these inﬂuences).
229. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech, 17 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 137, 138–40, 154–59 (1994) (suggesting each of the foregoing strategies, among
others, as potential means “to promote freedom of speech” by “promot[ing] attention to
public issues and diversity of view” and thereby “diminish[ing] the inﬂuence of money
over the content of broadcasting”).
230. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp.
L. Rev. 427, 428–33 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, Future of Free Expression] (net
neutrality); Yochai Benkler, Ending the Internet’s Trench Warfare, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/opinion/21Benkler.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (open access).
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structure of communication. In this spirit, Professor Tim Wu has recently
proposed “[n]ew laws or regulations requiring that major speech
platforms behave as public trustees, with general duties to police fake
users, remove propaganda robots, and promote a robust speech
environment surrounding matters of public concern.”231
However exactly they are framed, these proposals reﬂect a
conviction that a well-functioning “system of free speech depends not
only on the mere absence of state censorship, but also on an
infrastructure of free expression.”232 The Constitution must not stand in
the way of building this infrastructure; on the contrary, it may need to be
recruited as an ally in the effort. “When the state acts to enhance the
quality of public debate,” Fiss writes in a representative passage, “we
should recognize its actions as consistent with the First Amendment.”233
“What is more, when on occasions it fails to, we can with conﬁdence
demand that the state so act.”234
Brought together by these basic commitments, egalitarian theorists
of the “system of free speech” nevertheless vary in their normative and
institutional emphases. For instance, some systemic theorists seek to
establish a constitutional pedigree for their policy prescriptions, insisting
that the First Amendment itself demands or at least motivates their
proposals. Most others, however, ground their prescriptions in the
subconstitutional or extraconstitutional demands of democracy, social
justice, or prudence, seeking to establish only that the First Amendment
does not forbid them.235 Likewise, some systemic theorists foreground the
231. Wu, Obsolete, supra note 158, at 23. These measures are needed, in Wu’s view, to
counter the rise of “troll armies,” “ﬂooding” tactics, “fake news,” and other new or
intensifying threats to the digital speech environment. Id. at 11–17, 23–26.
232. Balkin, Future of Free Expression, supra note 230, at 432. As Balkin elaborated
this claim in an inﬂuential early effort to reimagine the systemic perspective for the
internet era:
Protecting freedom of speech in the digital age means promoting a
core set of values in legislation, administrative regulation, and the design
of technology. What are those values? They are interactivity, broad
popular participation, equality of access to information and
communications technology, promotion of democratic control in
technological design, and the practical ability of ordinary people to
route around, glom on, and transform.
Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 96, at 52.
233. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1416.
234. Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1987)
(suggesting that state regulation of speech with the goal of “furthering free speech
values . . . is consistent with, and may even be required by, the [F]irst [A]mendment”);
Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, a Constitutional Value for the 21st Century,
36 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 145, 245 (2013) (drawing on German constitutional
jurisprudence in suggesting that the First Amendment be read to require public “access to
a diversity of ideas and a fullness of information”).
235. Compare, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment
Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1641 (1967) (arguing for “a twentieth century interpretation
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expressive interests of marginalized speakers, whereas most others
appear to prioritize the informational interests of listeners.236 And some
systemic theorists envision a key role for the courts in developing robust
speech architectures, whereas most others downplay the judicial function
and focus on the incentives, responsibilities, and authorities that do or
should lead legislators and administrators to enact their preferred
reforms.237 In the language of this Essay,238 systemic theorists of the First
Amendment tend to be more minimalist than maximalist in their visions
of judicial review, asking the courts largely to step aside as the political
branches experiment with measures to enhance the quality, diversity, and
accessibility of public debate.
As explained above, the position that the political branches, and
only the political branches, should aggressively promote egalitarian First
Amendment rights fell into disrepute when the liberal compromise
supplanted progressive civil libertarianism in the mid-twentieth

of the [F]irst [A]mendment which will impose an affirmative responsibility on the
monopoly newspaper to act as sounding board for new ideas and old grievances”), and
Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1411 (“What the phrase ‘the freedom of speech’
in the [F]irst [A]mendment refers to is a social state of affairs, not the action of an
individual or institution.”), with Balkin, Future of Free Expression, supra note 230, at 441
(“Protecting free speech values in the digital age will be less and less a problem of
constitutional law . . . and more and more a problem of technology and administrative
regulation.”), and Wu, Obsolete, supra note 158, at 19 (affirming the “basic” proposition
that the First Amendment is “a negative right against coercive government action,” not “a
right against the conduct of nongovernmental actors” or “a right that obliges the
government to ensure a pristine speech environment”).
236. Compare, e.g., Barron, supra note 235, at 1678 (proposing “a right to be heard”
that would allow more speakers to obtain access to the mass media), with C. Edwin
Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 839, 854 (2002)
(criticizing a shift in First Amendment doctrine from treating media entities
“instrumentally,” and protecting their speech choices only insofar as they “serve the
interests of the audience in the receipt of uncensored and diverse content,” toward
“treating media enterprises as rights bearers in their own behalf”), and Fiss, Social
Structure, supra note 125, at 1411 (“[T]he key to fulﬁlling the ultimate purposes of the
[F]irst [A]mendment is not [speaker] autonomy . . . . In fact, autonomy adds nothing and
if need be, might have to be sacriﬁced, to make certain that public debate is sufficiently
rich to permit true collective self-determination.”).
237. Compare, e.g., Ammori, supra note 224, at 21 (identifying ﬁve doctrinal
“principles” that “reﬂect a substantive, value-laden concern for the availability of speech
spaces for all Americans” and arguing that these principles “should be adopted explicitly
by courts deciding questions concerning legislated or judicial access to speech spaces”),
and Barron, supra note 235, at 1678 (urging “the courts to fashion a remedy for a right of
access, at least in the most arbitrary cases, independently of legislation”), with C. Edwin
Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev.
733, 755–58 (2005) (criticizing “activist judicial review” of “media architecture” regulation
and noting that “the market is merely one among many possible architectures”), and Cass
R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 257 (1992) (criticizing judicial
interpretations of the First Amendment that “invalidate democratic efforts to promote the
principle of popular sovereignty”).
238. See supra section IV.A.
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century.239 Few if any of today’s systemic theorists openly repudiate the
resulting constitutional settlement. Even as he urges state intervention to
enhance public debate, for example, Fiss is careful to clarify that
“[j]udges are the ultimate guardians of constitutional values” and bear a
heavy “burden of guarding against the danger of First Amendment
counterproductivity.”240 Yet by placing so much stock in legislative and
administrative action and so little stock in judicial protection of negative
rights against government infringement of speech, some of the stronger
versions of the move from speaker to system may have quite disruptive
implications. Indeed, the very aspiration to engineer a “better” system of
free expression through the political process represents a challenge to
the prevailing “negative-liberty model” of the First Amendment and its
premise that “the central First Amendment purpose . . . is to keep
government out of speech.”241 As Professor Burt Neuborne has observed,
“[c]urrent Supreme Court doctrine is relentlessly speaker-centered” and
inattentive to the interests of “the hearer,”242 much less to the interests of
the expressive environment writ large. This state of affairs is partly
attributable to the structure of First Amendment litigation and partly to
the Court’s “uncompromising refusal to trust government speech
regulators with any signiﬁcant power.”243
In short, to ask judges to review free speech cases through a systemic
lens, or otherwise to defer to legislative and administrative judgments
about the speech system, is to imagine a very different First Amendment
regime from the one we have now. Insofar as the logic of egalitarian
critique pushes toward a systemic perspective, the question therefore
arises whether First Amendment Lochnerism could ever truly be
dispelled without a radical rethinking of existing doctrine, including the
limits imposed by the liberal compromise. The move from speaker to
system is the most powerful move in the contemporary grammar of
egalitarian First Amendment argument; its underlying account of free
speech does not merely complicate or chisel away at the deregulatory
Lochnerian paradigm but supplies a comprehensive alternative. It does
so, however, by putting pressure on First Amendment norms ranging
from content and viewpoint neutrality to the primacy of judicial
enforcement to the baseline opposition to redistribution of expressive
and informational resources. In threatening to displace such norms, the
pursuit of systemic egalitarianism may end up looking a good deal like a
revival of progressive civil libertarianism.
239. See supra notes 147–155 and accompanying text; supra section I.B.
240. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1420.
241. Ammori, supra note 224, at 8 (emphasis added). The negative-liberty
understanding of the First Amendment, Ammori explains, comes with the “corollaries of
government distrust, value-neutrality, and anti-redistribution.” Id. at 81.
242. Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s Neighborhood, 25
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 897, 897 (2017).
243. Id. at 902.
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CONCLUSION: THE EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN EXILE?
The search for an egalitarian First Amendment has never looked
harder. As this Essay has tried to show, it is not just the current composition of the Supreme Court or its most controversial free speech decisions
that account for the rise of First Amendment Lochnerism—a First
Amendment jurisprudence that disables redistributive regulation and
exacerbates socioeconomic inequality. Beyond the recent upsurge in conservative judicial appointees, a series of more fundamental developments
in American law and political economy has facilitated, and seems likely to
continue to facilitate, the spread of First Amendment Lochnerism. Three
in particular stand out: ﬁrst, the long-term growth of numerous overlapping forms of inequality from the 1970s through the present;244
second, the rise of informational capitalism in the marketplace and a
First Amendment–industrial complex in civil society;245 and third, the
surprising degree to which the midcentury liberal compromise between
progressive and reactionary understandings of the First Amendment has
delegitimated efforts to redistribute expressive and informational
resources while legitimating an increasingly inegalitarian socioeconomic
structure.246
In terms of both knowledge and power, legal egalitarians are best
equipped to interrogate and to challenge the third development: the
tendency of the liberal compromise, and the presumptively benign First
Amendment jurisprudence it has produced, to favor First Amendment
Lochnerism. Yet legal egalitarians cannot simply renounce the liberal
compromise. Or, at least, they cannot do so without committing to a
practically difficult and normatively fraught renovation of American
constitutionalism writ large. This is because the features of the liberal
compromise that allow First Amendment Lochnerism to thrive are
intrinsic to the broader constitutional settlement that emerged from the
New Deal. These include the primacy of judicial enforcement of civil
libertarian rights and the reconceptualization of such rights as limitations on the state’s regulatory role, irrespective of the regulated parties’
relative socioeconomic power. Although the renunciation of these
features might well forestall the spread of First Amendment Lochnerism,
it would also undermine the very constitutional settlement that legal
egalitarians currently seek to defend from conservative attack on
multiple fronts.247
244. See supra notes 2–19 and accompanying text (surveying historical and economic
diagnoses of contemporary American inequality).
245. See supra Part II.
246. See supra notes 37–84 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of the
liberal compromise and its facilitation of inegalitarian First Amendment doctrine).
247. See generally Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 111, at 969–71 (discussing
contemporary legal liberals’ “defensive” constitutional posture and “small-c conservative
orientation toward the Constitution”).
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Faced with this conundrum, this Essay has canvassed First
Amendment scholarship in search of ways around it, paths that may have
gone unnoticed because theorists and historians were seeking solutions
to a different problem. We ﬁnd that traditional First Amendment
theorizing in the grand style—a style motivated by justiﬁcatory ideals
such as truth, autonomy, and democracy—is too empirically thin and
politically inert to be of much use in this search.248 Elsewhere, however,
in scholarship more focused on concrete policy matters and persistent
doctrinal ambiguities, we identify two relatively coherent and consistent
strategies that remain available to legal egalitarians opposed to First
Amendment Lochnerism. These strategies parallel familiar dichotomies
from the social sciences: voice and exit,249 reform and revolution.250 The
ﬁrst strategy (voice, reform) is to remain within the world of the liberal
compromise and to test its institutional and doctrinal boundaries. Might
these boundaries extend farther, or prove less ﬁxed, than previously
thought? Notwithstanding the current composition of the federal
judiciary, might new territory be found along the margins where a more
egalitarian speech environment could ﬂourish? As discussed in Part IV,
contemporary First Amendment scholars, including participants in this
Symposium, have not only asked these questions but also developed a
grammar with which to answer them—a set of midlevel doctrinal and
empirical arguments that seek to justify special judicial solicitude for the
expressive and informational interests of the socioeconomically
disadvantaged. Such solicitude may take the form of either stronger or
weaker enforcement of preexisting First Amendment principles, found
scattered across the precedential landscape.
This egalitarian grammar is highly suggestive of new ways to practice
and to theorize First Amendment law. In their very generativity, however,
the most powerful egalitarian arguments tend to move rapidly toward the
frontier, to the edge of the liberal compromise if not beyond it
altogether. Here we ﬁnd the other means of evading First Amendment
Lochnerism that our overview of free speech theory and historiography
has identiﬁed. What lies beyond the liberal compromise? We suspect that
the answer will resemble the approach that the liberal compromise itself
displaced: the progressive civil libertarianism of the early-to-mid-twentieth
century.251
248. See supra Part III.
249. See generally Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 3–5 (1970) (identifying “exit” and “voice” as
competing strategic responses available to dissatisﬁed members of an organization).
250. See generally Göran Therborn, Science, Class, and Society: On the Formation of
Sociology and Historical Materialism 115–44 (Verso 1980) (1976) (describing the selfconscious emergence of the distinction between reform and revolution in the midnineteenth century).
251. See supra section IV.C (suggesting that standard liberal arguments for giving
greater weight to the “speech on both sides” of free speech controversies tend to push

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249794

2018]

AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT

2009

This exiled alternative to the liberal compromise is in some respects
reminiscent of the “Constitution in Exile” of the conservative legal
imagination.252 Both the Constitution in Exile and progressive civil
libertarianism seek to forge a new constitutional political economy—one
that is more libertarian or egalitarian, respectively—by using civil
libertarian argument. Both trace their origins to the far side of the New
Deal settlement, a settlement that putatively committed the zealous
protection of noneconomic rights to the federal judiciary while
entrusting the rational management of economic rights to Congress and
the executive branch. At the same time, if the conservative Constitution
in Exile or progressive civil libertarianism were ever to return, each
would undoubtedly look quite different from what the actual legal
culture of the early twentieth century allowed. While progressive civil
libertarianism does not claim an originalist pedigree, hardly anyone is a
thoroughgoing originalist when it comes to free speech.253 Perhaps the
most striking divide between these two exiled legal regimes is that
progressive civil libertarianism—even in an updated and domesticated
form—does not claim at this time any signiﬁcant constituency within the
legal academy.
Yet as this Symposium reﬂects, the sheer ambition of today’s First
Amendment Lochnerism may be creating an opening for equally
ambitious progressive projects. For instance, mainstream legal liberals
seem more willing to question the “negative-liberty model” of the First
Amendment254 than they have been in decades. The ACLU is reportedly
debating whether to reorient its free speech practice around “standing
up for the marginalized.”255 Might the disruptive nature of the Roberts
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence generate a countervailing
movement of real consequence? The answer to this question will depend,
in part, on whether progressive civil libertarianism can be reimagined for
the digital age in ways that make good on its egalitarian promise while
limiting possibilities for government censorship and abuse. Those
scholars and practitioners who take up this challenge will inevitably
toward a “systemic” perspective on free speech regulation, which in turn tends to push
toward progressive civil libertarianism).
252. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for
Legal Theory, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2253 (2014) (describing and defending the concept
of a constitution in exile). “Nowadays,” Sachs notes, “the idea that constitutional practice
may have gone seriously wrong” is most often attributed to conservative “originalists—
followers, allegedly, of a nefarious ‘Constitution in Exile,’ waiting in their subterranean
lairs to subdue the populace and abolish the New Deal.” Id. at 2254.
253. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 241–243 and accompanying text.
255. Mark Joseph Stern, Who Does the ACLU Fight For?, Slate (Aug. 27, 2018),
http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/the-aclus-decision-to-defend-the-nra-is-under-attackinternally.html [https://perma.cc/78WS-CE5Z]; see also id. (stating that the ACLU has
already “moved toward incorporating what one staff attorney described as ‘power analysis’
into its free speech litigation”).
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disagree on many matters of normative priority and institutional detail.
But the challenge must ﬁrst be seen with clear eyes. Before any
meaningful progress can be made toward overcoming First Amendment
Lochnerism, its critics may need to affirm a more basic theoretical and
practical point, a point that we hope this Essay has helped to establish:
Progressive civil libertarianism is not a contradiction in terms.
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